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Preface
This evaluation was commissioned by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) via
the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), which issued a request for proposals
to eight organizations on September 2, 2004. On the basis of these proposals, the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was selected to conduct the
evaluation. GICHD fielded a four member evaluation team, led by an independent consultant,
to complete the assignment.
The members of the evaluation team wish to express their appreciation for the cooperation of
all individuals who have contributed their insights that lie at the root of our findings. We have
discussed the unfolding of the UNMEE MACC story, its successes and its challenges, with
people too numerous to be mentioned here. Nevertheless, Justin Brady of UNMAS deserves
special recognition for generously helping us develop a basic understanding of the issues
before travelling to Eritrea. Phil Lewis, UNMEE MACC Programme Manager in Asmara,
spent much valuable time with us and always kept his door open to answer more questions.
Gerhard Bechtold took pains to explain all the intricacies of information technology, Vankata
Raman was helpful in many essential ways, and Andrea Poelling expertly arranged interviews
and was able to track important data. Thank you all.
Frans Anema
Johannes Dirscherl
Ted Paterson
Phil Bean

Team leader
Mechanical specialist
Evaluation manager and economist
IMAS specialist

This report incorporates – as Annex 5 – the letter of response from the management of
UNMAS.
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Executive Summary
The 30-year war between Ethiopia and Eritrea (1961-1991 war of independence from
Ethiopia), as well as the border conflict between the two countries (1998-2000), left a legacy
of serious mine and UXO contamination. As soon as a comprehensive peace agreement was
signed in 2000, contributions poured in from donor countries including, among other things,
much support to demining operations as a precursor to humanitarian assistance activities and
development work.
With the establishment of the UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) shortly after the
cessation of hostilities, mine action commenced. Three countries (Slovak Republic, Kenya
and Bangladesh) contributed demining assets and worked in collaboration with a civilian-run
UN Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC). The UNMEE MACC received its mandate
from the Security Council in the form of three resolutions, certainly the first of which left
much to individual interpretation. The interpretation by the MACC was a liberal one, leading
to an extremely hectic pace of work during the first two years, involving mine action and
institutional development activities. The first Security Council resolution called, among other
things, for coordination of humanitarian mine action activities, a rather obscure concept that
was not backed up by a formal agreement with the Government of Eritrea. Nor was it
subjected to a strategic plan or a set of precisely defined terms of reference. It is clear from
experience that considerable effort should be made to define the responsibilities of a MACC
attached to a peacekeeping force with utmost clarity and precision, requiring active
participation by UNMAS in the planning for peacekeeping missions.
In spite of some very noteworthy achievements, including the virtual re-establishment of the
National Training Centre and the training and equipping of three national demining teams
under the former Eritrean Demining Agency (EDA-1)1, the MACC experienced a number of
setbacks. Partly because of the vagueness of mandate, other competing demands, as well as a
serious under-estimation of the challenges of issuing tasking orders, the MACC’s
coordination function was not effective, an assessment corroborated by opinions of various
respondents. Nor were the mine action capacity development activities undertaken by the
MACC ultimately successful (in spite of effective mine clearance training activities), partly
because a temporary mine action centre associated with the peacekeeping force is not always
a natural conduit for this type of activity, and partly because there was a lack of clear national
commitment and a precise, formally written and signed agreement at the highest level. In mid
2002, the President of Eritrea issued a proclamation in which he announced the establishment
of a national Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). About a month later he announced the
expulsion of international mine action NGOs, accusing them of being “all over the place”. In
spite of some noteworthy progress in local mine action capacity building by the MACC
during the first two years of the Mission, the establishment of EDA amounted to a virtual
denial of achievements in this area. The President left the door open for the UNDP to start a
mine action capacity building programme anew, now under different circumstances, and
separate from the MACC. The proclamation thoroughly affected the operations and the
mandate of the UNMEE MACC, limiting the latter to a focus on Force-support only. Many

1

Not to be confused with the Government’s Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) which was established
as a consequence of Proclamation 123 in mid-2002, disbanding the existing Eritrean Mine Action
Programme (EMAP).
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donors withdrew funding support from the country, with the noticeable exception of the
Dutch (some smaller contributions continued by the Canadians and the Norwegians).
The UNMEE MACC lost no time in re-defining its mission and the management structure of
its activities. It did so with competence and creativity. Of importance in this respect is the
decision to integrate Peacekeeping Force demining capacity within a civilian-run MACC
while preserving the final authority of the Force Commander in priority setting and tasking of
the Force assets. This innovative approach, which can be replicated elsewhere under similar
circumstances, earned the MACC a UN 21 award.
While much useful work has been accomplished during the last two years, it is clear that the
scope of activities of UNMEE MACC has diminished greatly compared to the period before
the President’s Proclamation in July 2002. Especially with respect to mine action capacity
building, MACC’s responsibilities have been confined to ad hoc support of the EDA upon
request, except in the area of information technology and medical support where the MACC
still plays an ongoing supportive role. In most other areas, the EDA now benefits from
effective (but currently under-funded) UNDP assistance. It is important to mention that the
relative success of the UNDP in this regard is partly due to the transfer of deminers and HQ
staff trained by the MACC and NGOs to this new organization and its operating arm (EDO).
Experience would suggest that national capacity development should start immediately after
cessation of hostilities, but that capacity development support by an entity closely associated
with peacekeeping forces is not automatically acceptable to local authorities and should be
undertaken with great trepidation. Experience would also suggest that absolute clarity in roles
of a MACC, especially roles lying outside traditional Force support functions, be established
through an agreement at the highest level.
With a scope of activities that is currently more confined than before, with access to both the
assessed budgetary resources and the Voluntary Trust Fund, and with sufficient staff
resources, the MACC could justifiably consider tasks that would logically complement
current MACC responsibilities. Of interest in this respect is the objective of the Force
Commander, in line with the broader objectives of the mission overall, to try to “win the
hearts and minds of the local population”.2 Well-planned and well-defined demining activities
in support of Force requirements and Force mobility, with significant secondary benefits for
the local population, might play an important role in this respect. Such an approach seems
especially viable when a Mission has moved from a state of emergency to a state of stability.
In this respect, Force requirements should be reviewed on an agreed basis and time scale.
Great success has been achieved in establishing an effective and efficient unit dealing with
information technology. The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has
proven to be a most powerful tool in Eritrean mine action, in spite of the fact that a number of
serious challenges remain in establishing a fully viable system. Statistics and maps currently
benefit all mine action activities in the nation. A number of IMSMA insufficiencies have been
resolved with so-called “add-ons”, i.e. measures to provide required data the system cannot
yet generate on its own. (Subsequent to our mission, most of these add-ons were removed
after the installation of an updated version of IMSMA.) Certain operational improvements can
be envisaged, including the need for significant simplification of the system.
2

The distinction between the mandate of the Peacekeeping Force and that of the broader mission
also should be recognised, and is discussed at greater length in the body of the report.
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Some serious problems have been encountered in terms of efficiency and effectiveness of
troop-contributing demining assets. Mechanical equipment turned out to be hugely
inappropriate and excessive, not to speak of the formidable expenses involved. Productivity of
the Slovak contingent was minimal, and the Slovak deminers plus their equipment were
eventually replaced by commercial assets. A serious and dangerous absence of international
mine action standards (IMAS) was observed in the operations of the Bangladeshi demining
contingent, and only the Kenyan contingent appeared to have been properly trained to
perform in an IMAS-compliant fashion. The Joint Assessment Mission will need to play a
much more vital role in determining the right mix and type of demining assets right at the
initial planning stage for a peacekeeping mission. It also seems clear that DPKO will need to
institutionalise the authority and competence to negotiate with troop contributing countries to
ensure the best contribution suited to circumstances. Military assets will need to be assessed
prior to deployment, and arrangements should be made to review the use of the assets after
one year (and periodically thereafter) in order to introduce possible adjustments. With respect
to the application of international standards, training may need to be provided prior to
deployment, and UNMAS may wish to quality assure existing regional training programmes
for this purpose (in Kenya, Ukraine, and Benin). There is also scope for donors to contribute
to training and equipment if necessary.
In comparison to contingent assets, the introduction of commercial demining assets has turned
out to be very cost-effective indeed. While a peacekeeping mission would likely wish to
maintain contingent demining prowess (assuming some of the steps mentioned earlier are
introduced to enhance performance), the use of complementary commercial assets3 right at the
start of a mission should be seriously considered.
A number of recommendations and lessons learned have been defined and appear in the
Conclusions (Chapter 10).

3

We use the term “commercial assets” to refer to demining assets contracted on commercial terms
(usually via a competitive process) and not to distinguish between for-profit and not-for-profit
organisations. We are making no assessment of the relative performance or capabilities of for-profit
versus not-for-profit organisations in the demining field.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
On December 12, 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in
Algiers. It ended more than two years of serious border conflict that resulted in countless
casualties and displaced people. A Temporary Security Zone (TSZ), 25 km wide and 1000 km
long, now separates the two countries. The zone, located mostly on Eritrean soil, has a serious
contamination of landmines and UXO. A UN Peacekeeping Force in excess of 4,000 troops
was dispatched shortly after the agreement was signed. Unfortunately, there is no resolution
yet with respect to the precise demarcation of the border, in spite of a short-lived agreement
by both parties to abide by the recommendations of an independent border commission.
With the arrival of the UN Peacekeeping Force, a mine action programme began. The
programme received its mandate from the Security Council, Resolution 1320, and two
subsequent resolutions. Perhaps the most important event during the last four years was the
unexpected decision by the President of Eritrea to expel international non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) engaged in mine action, and to establish a new national mine action
authority called the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). The decision abruptly stopped much
demining activities in the TSZ, and drastically changed the scope of work for the MACC
attached to the UN peacekeeping mission.
After some four years of operations, it was felt useful to evaluate the mine action programme
in order to learn from experiences gained. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) was selected by UNOPS/UNMAS to conduct the evaluation, and a team
of evaluation and mine action specialists commenced work in October 2004. The team
consisted of two technical experts with knowledge of mine action standards and mechanical
demining techniques, one specialist in management and evaluation methodology (team
leader), and one evaluation manager stationed in Geneva, who also conducted the economic
analysis based principally on data obtained from UNMEE MACC.
The goals of the evaluation were to (i) define the coordinating role of the programme through
mid-2002; (ii) the optimal integration of peacekeeping force demining assets under a civilianrun coordination centre; and (iii) provide a cost-benefit analysis of peacekeeping demining
versus commercial demining. Further elaboration concerning these goals was provided
through nine evaluation objectives and 21 evaluation issues. Given the breadth of the
assignment and the budget constraints that emerged,4 GICHD recommended that the
evaluation team focus on those issues most central to UNMAS and its current policy agenda.
During the discussions in New York, UNMAS advised that the evaluation team, while not
abandoning the first goal, should indeed focus on the second and third goals plus the specific
objectives and evaluation issues associated with these goals.
The first three members of the team spent a week in New York for discussions with staff of
UNMAS, UNOPS, DPKO and others able to provide special insights. The team leader and the
mechanical expert then travelled to Eritrea and spent close to three weeks meeting with staff
of the mine action centre, members of UN specialised agencies, officials and representatives
of donor countries. A major problem encountered was that the relevant representatives of the
4

The budget for the exercise was reduced following the preparation of the Terms of Reference. As a
result, GICHD was asked to reduce its cost proposal by about 25 per cent, which then necessitated a
tighter focus for the evaluation.
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Eritrean government did not make themselves available for meetings with the evaluation
team, leaving a serious but unavoidable gap in the evidence-base from which to draw
conclusions and recommendations. The mission team also observed demining operations in
the field, and analysed numerous documents. The team did not travel to Ethiopia but
concentrated its research on mine action in the TSZ and adjacent areas. In Europe, team
members visited the Netherlands and Sweden for follow-up meetings with donor country
representatives, and Bratislava to review the mandate and performance of the Slovak
demining contingent.5
In October 2004, shortly after its mission to Eritrea, the evaluation team also distributed
questionnaires to the international NGOs active in Eritrea at the time of the expulsion order in
August 2002. Cursory responses were received for the most part; the reason being that the
officers most familiar with the events surrounding the expulsion had moved on in the
intervening years. HALO Trust provided a lengthy response, but this arrived in early February
2005, some weeks after the presentation and discussion of the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations contained in the draft report6 with UNMAS and UNOPS in New York, and
shortly after the draft final version of the report had been completed.
The submission from HALO Trust raised some fundamental questions relating to the
coordination role played by UNMEE MACC. In light of this, and despite the fact that this
submission arrived so late in the process, UNMAS, UNOPS, and GICHD agreed that the draft
final should be further revised to elaborate somewhat on the issues raised in the HALO
submission. The Evaluation Team were able to contact some others who were closely
involved in the mine action efforts in Eritrea during the period leading-up to the expulsion
order, or who were active in the Mine Action Support Group (MASG)7 at the time.8 A byproduct of this decision was, of course, further delay in presenting the final report. Events in
Eritrea have had significant effect on the country’s mine action programme, and this report no
longer reflects the current status on the ground. Nonetheless, a number of the conclusions and
recommendations are important in general and, in particular, for mine action operations
during the course of peacekeeping operations. The subsequent events in no way impinge on
their validity or relevance of these conclusions and recommendations.

5

Unfortunately, the officials met in Bratislava had not been directly involved during the period the
Slovak demining units and equipment were part of UNMEE, and provided only limited information.
6
The draft report was submitted in early December, and the meeting in New York was 17 January
2005. HALO Trust’s comments had been delayed in part because their programme manager for
Eritrea for the relevant period had since moved to another organisation. On his own initiative, this
individual had, in mid-January, submitted a response to the questionnaire, which his former colleagues
had forwarded to him – of course, he emphasised that he was responding in his personal capacity and
his views should not be construed as the official position of HALO Trust.
7
The MASG comprises (mainly) New York-based representatives of countries which actively support
mine action. Initially quite informal, it has enlarged its role gradually over the years, and by 2002 was
an important forum for information-sharing between UN agencies and donor countries. Unfortunately,
the regular practice of preparing thorough minutes and distributing these widely appears only to have
started in November 2002, just after the expulsion order (a MASG meeting had occurred on 5
September 2002, and a number of presentations were made concerning the Eritrean expulsion order.
We have obtained at least some of these statements, but were unable to obtain the minutes
themselves.
8
As many of the points at issue were left unresolved in the immediate aftermath of the expulsion and,
indeed, remain so today, these individuals contributed in a personal capacity on the assurance of
confidentiality, and the additional information provided is speculative to some degree. Their names are
not listed in Annex 4.
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All four members of the evaluation team contributed to the drafting of the final report;
conclusions and recommendations resulted from close team interaction. The report is an
attempt to trace the development of the overall demining effort in the Temporary Security
Zone, learn from the findings and define recommendations for the future. Chapter 2 provides
an historical and political perspective placing mine action in the TSZ into context. The next
chapter deals with the question of mandate, the relative vagueness of which has given rise to
various interpretations of responsibilities. This chapter also deals briefly with the innovative
model of integrated management that has earned the MACC a UN 21 award for excellence.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with aspects of operations of the MACC, the changing nature and the
challenges of its work, its relation to national authorities and other mine action actors, its
financing, and its staffing. Chapter 7 provides a commentary on information technology and
the excellent work the MACC has done in this area in spite of tools that are still undergoing
growing pains. Chapters 8 and 9 deal with the technical aspects of demining assets deployed,
the problems encountered, and the cost-effectiveness of using commercial as opposed to
military assets, as well as some observations on the performance of UNOPS. The last chapter
provides conclusions, defines the lessons learned, and lists all recommendations made in the
report.
One last point requires mention. GICHD is responsible for supporting and further
development of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The Terms
of Reference included the requirement to “Evaluate the effectiveness of the IMSMA system
and determine how it has contributed to the overall management of the mine action
programme in Eritrea.” Clearly there is a potential conflict of interest, which GICHD
managed in the following fashion:
•
•
•
•

It clearly declared the potential conflict of interest in its proposal, together with the
steps it would take to mitigate this, (as below):
It engaged an independent consultant of established repute from outside the Mine
Action field to serve as Team Leader for the Evaluation;
It specifically tasked the independent consultant/team leader with the responsibility for
the assessment of the information management function of UNMEE MACC, including
the IMSMA;
No members of the evaluation team discussed the IMSMA in Eritrea with the IMSMA
unit in GICHD until the draft report was completed, at which point a copy of the draft
report was distributed to the IMSMA unit at GICHD for comment along with other
stakeholders.

3
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Chapter 2 – Historical and Political Context
2.1

Eritrea’s Struggle for Independence

An understanding of the challenges that UNMEE MACC has had to face in the past, and is
still facing today, requires a brief exposé of the country's recent history.
Eritrea has been under colonial rule for long periods of time. Italian colonization started in
1881 and lasted for 60 years, until 1941. Establishing an outpost in Assab in 1881, the Italians
moved northward to Massawa and in 1890 the Italian king proclaimed the colony of Eritrea,
with the port of Massawa as its capital. The capital was moved to Asmara in the mid 1890's
and a period of infrastructure development (roads and communications networks)
commenced. However, strict colour-based restrictions were placed on the local population,
excluding locals from schools, jobs and social services.
In the face of an assault by British forces in 1941, Italy lost control over Eritrea. The British
stayed until 1952 and introduced a number of reforms that allowed new forms of organisation,
including an institutional framework for political action. The disposition of Italy's former
colonies fell to the newly established United Nations. The latter approved a controversial
proposal by the United States to establish a federation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the latter
being granted the right of self-administration with authority over the police, local taxes and
other domestic affairs, but with Ethiopia controlling Eritrea's defence, foreign affairs, finance
and international trade.
Over the next decade Ethiopia was accused of asserting itself on Eritrea's domestic affairs.
Ethiopia decreed a preventive detention law, arrested newspaper editors, drove prominent
nationalists into exile, and banned trade unions and political parties. On November 14, 1962,
the Eritrean Parliament was dissolved and Eritrea was annexed as Ethiopia's fourteenth
province.
On July 1960 the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was established by exiled Eritreans in Cairo
and a little more than a year later a small band of ELF guerrillas, armed with antiquated
Italian rifles, fired the first shots on police in western Eritrea. The country's 30-year liberation
struggle had started. Internal rivalries weakened the ELF but near the end of the decade the
struggle was resumed with renewed vigour under a re-organised command and a new name:
the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The struggle was hard on the whole population
and in the mid-1980s war and famine combined to create a human crisis of horrific
proportions. By 1985, some 360,000 Eritrean refugees had fled to Sudan. Several hundred
thousand more were internally displaced.
Eventually Eritrea gained its independence in 1991, and a period of reconstruction started.
Rumblings of war started anew, however. Throughout 1996 and 1997, tensions arose between
Eritrea and Ethiopia over economic and political issues. There followed a series of armed
incidents causing the death of several officials near Badme, a small, dry and dusty village in
the western region of Eritrea. Three rounds of combat in 1998-2000 produced hundreds of
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thousands of casualties and resulted in countless Internally Displaced People (IDPs).9
Eventually Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to a cease-fire, and on December 12, 2000, the two
countries signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Algiers. Under its terms, a 25 km
wide Temporary Security Zone was established, largely within Eritrea, to be patrolled by UN
peacekeeping forces.
The forces were mandated to operate in the TSZ and “adjacent areas”, a term roughly defined
by the UN as 15 km either side of the TSZ boundary and inserted into the mandate to allow
for some flexibility in the interpretation and, especially, the execution of tasks. The TSZ is
primarily located on Eritrean soil which tends to influence the relationship between the
Eritrean Government and the PKF. This sensitive fact may have contributed to the attitude
displayed by the Government in drastically revising mine action authority in the zone (see
below).
Landmine and UXO contamination is spread throughout Eritrea, and it is serious. After the
Landmine Impact Study (LIS), some 310 sq. km. were suspected of being contaminated
(IMSMA data).
Decisions and attitudes of the current Eritrean Government should be seen in the light of this
historical background and the seriousness of the contamination. The Eritreans are a proud and
independent people who, indeed, fought and sacrificed for a very long period of time to gain
their freedom. They gained it with little outside help, and they are not prepared now to
welcome such help in an uncritical way, having been disappointed in the past. This spirit of
independence also tends to explain the drastic decision in mid 2002 to expel foreign demining
NGOs, thus bringing a virtual halt to all national and NGO demining activities in the country.

2.2

Proclamation 123 (2002)

In mid 2002, the President of Eritrea, H.E Isayas Afworki, surprised the donor community by
announcing the establishment of a new demining agency (the Eritrean Demining Authority or
EDA), and disbanding the existing one (the Eritrean Mine Action Programme or EMAP).
Shortly thereafter he ordered all demining NGOs to leave the country. Three NGOs left
promptly - Danish Church Aid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), and Mine Awareness
Trust (MAT). A fourth NGO (HALO Trust) managed to stay on for roughly another year –
and even planned an expansion of its project – but then also departed.10 What motivated the
President to take such a drastic step?
During a meeting with UN representatives on August 23, 2002, the President made the
following essential comments. His main concern is the return of IDPs. To this end he wants to
expedite landmine clearance. There have been undue delays in clearance. The effectiveness of
9

Accurate statistics on IDPs and Refugees are hard to come by. UNHCR estimates that, since the
beginning of their work in Eritrea in 2000, some 200,000 refugees have returned home (Eritrea at
large, few to the TSZ), mostly from Sudan. Of these, some 80,000 returned spontaneously, and
120,000 returned with the assistance of UNHCR. The latter estimates that some 50-60,000 refugees
still reside in Sudan as registered refugees, and double this figure as non-registered refugees.
UNHCR notices a current outflow of Eritreans to Sudan and Ethiopia. UNHCR is not dealing with IDPs,
and statistics on them are not available (UNMEE MACC has tried for years to obtain an accurate
picture of IDPs in the TSZ, thus far to no avail).
10
The commercial demining company Ronco, funded by the US State Department, managed to
continue operations after intervention by the US.
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NGOs is questionable: they seem to be “all over the place”. Even worse, UNMEE's demining
work is slow, very expensive,11 and very ineffective.12 It cannot deliver, and should not
become involved in demining for demarcation, which should be left to a professional
demining company. Eritrea will establish its own demining authority. We will do it on our
own. We want to start with a clean slate. But, even though UNMEE is “a new kind of
monster”, other UN agencies could play a useful role in the country (e.g. health and
education). We will plan and design our own mine action structure, and submit it to the
relevant UN specialised agencies to decide if they want to participate.
His comments contained a strong flavour of wanting to go it alone, no matter what the costs.
His words showed a profound distrust of UNMEE mine action capabilities. He appeared to
have a genuine concern for IDPs. He also expressed great scepticism with respect to the
coordination of NGO activities, and of their ultimate usefulness. Indeed, this scepticism
apparently had been growing for some time, and various NGO informants mentioned that they
had been very concerned about it during the days leading up to the proclamation.13 There was
no indication that UNMAS was either aware of the developing situation, or took
precautionary steps to avoid an outburst.
The decision to start with a clean slate angered many in the UN and NGO community. Indeed,
it would have been much preferable to attain local mine action self-sufficiency by phasing out
NGOs over time and incorporating their competence into local institutional arrangements.
Instead, the embryonic Eritrean Mine Action Programme, whose offices were located on the
premises of the MACC, was disbanded and a new organisation was created, at least in name –
the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA). Mine action had come to a virtual halt and would not
come back to life until at least a year later through some sporadic core staff appointments and
UNDP assistance. The wish to do it on their own is very laudable, but it requires a readiness
to allocate sufficient resources, and a willingness to accept technical advice until selfsufficiency is reached. The reality is that it took considerable time for EDA to work on its
own and it still depends heavily on UNDP assistance in capacity building. The appointment of
the General Manager took time; the work of the UNDP capacity support team has been
hampered by a lack of sufficient counterparts, EDA's operating arm (Eritrean Demining
Operation - EDO) lacks support in terms of logistics, equipment, and supplies.
On the more positive side, however, EDO now has a number of demining teams at work
(manual cum mine detection dogs), and has plans to expand in the near future. These teams
are doing work in accordance with IMAS, in very difficult terrain. The draconian decision to
expel NGOs in order to force mine action self-sufficiency seemed ill advised but, given time
and UNDP's continued support, EDA capacity may slowly develop further. This is especially
so since there are signs of a re-awakened donor interest with, for example, substantial
contributions by Norway to UNDP's capacity building project.
11

In addition to the high costs of the many expatriates in the MACC and various Mine Action
organisations, a specific concern of the powerful Ministry of Defence was the comparatively high
salaries paid to deminers by the international demining organisations, which led to dissatisfaction
within their own engineering units.
12
Of course the President has a military background. HALO Trust’s reply to our questionnaire and
their earlier correspondence with members of the Mine Action Support Group (MASG) make particular
reference to clearance operations at Shilalo (conducted by UNMACC and Minetech), and said the
President was aware of, and extremely dissatisfied with, the details of that task, in which two EDA-a
deminers died.
13
See, for example, the presentations submitted or made to the MASG in August-September 2002.
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Of great benefit, in the interim, has been the work of Ronco, a US-based demining firm
(working on behalf of the US State Department), which reports to EDA. The company is
engaged in land clearance using two teams of 60 individuals per team, divided into four units
each, with manual detectors and a total of 15 dogs. It manages to clear, to the highest
standards, some 200,000 square meters a month; substantially more than any other area
clearance operation in the country (see discussion on cost effectiveness in chapter 9).14

2.3

The Current Stalemate

One would hope the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities signed in Algiers on December
12, 2000, would have been the end of the trials and tribulations of the two nations. But it may
not be so. The Ethiopian-Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC), an independent body of
international experts, who were approved in advance by both parties, was established to
examine and recommend the precise boundary between the two countries. The deliberations
of this Commission were based on, among many other things, a close examination of old
Italian maps. The Commission concluded its deliberations in 2003, recommending in detail
the location of the boundary. Its recommendations were fully accepted by both parties. Not
long afterwards, however, Ethiopia had a change of mind and announced that it could not
accept the inclusion of Badme, the dusty hamlet, into Eritrean territory. Since then there has
been a stalemate, with tensions rising. In his progress report on Ethiopia and Eritrea dated
July 2004, the Secretary General mentions a deterioration in the relations between UNMEE
and the Eritrean Government. The deterioration manifested itself in a number of areas,
including restrictions on the Mission's freedom of movement, closure of an important supply
route to UNMEE traffic, continuing detentions by the authorities of locally recruited UN staff,
and a recent spate of public statements by some Eritrean officials attacking the peacekeeping
operation and its staff.15 Although the Secretary General reported slight improvements in his
next progress report of September 2, 2004,16 the relationship remains tense.
The UN envoy, Dr. Lloyd Axworthy of Canada, appointed to try to mediate between the two
countries, has thus far failed to gain access to Eritrea's President who maintains that there is
nothing to discuss since both parties already have agreed.
Also important are indications of strong top-down management of the country. Recently all
internet cafés in Asmara were closed. Young men were picked from the streets of Asmara to
do their military service (a practice that is not new to the country). Insiders fear that the
possibility of armed conflict cannot be excluded in the future, even the near future. The
Boundary Commission remains unable to proceed with the demarcation of the border. Its (by
now very limited) presence in the area may have to be terminated by the end of 2004 in order
to preserve remaining funds earmarked for demarcation activities.
Given this historical background, the current political climate and the stalemate with respect
to demarcation, how relevant is the current mandate of UNMEE MACC? In the next chapter
14

Mechem, another highly effective demining firm working for UNMEE MACC is currently engaged for
road clearance, and no valid comparison with Ronco’s area clearance can be made.
15
Security Council, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, July 7, 2004,
S/2004/543.
16
Security Council, Progress report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, September 2,
2004, S/2004/708.
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we will examine this question in some detail, starting with a review of the Security Council
Resolutions that have thus far defined the framework of the MACC's activities.
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Chapter 3 – The Mandate of UNMEE MAC
3.1

Security Council Resolutions

The UNMEE MACC received its mandate from two Security Council resolutions:
Security Council Resolution 1320 (2000):
Coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the
TSZ and area adjacent to it.
Security Council Resolution 1430 (2002)
Demining in key areas to support demarcation.
There are other security council references to mine action relating to UNMEE:
•

Security Council Resolution 1344 (2001) incorporated the following statement:
“Facilitate mine action in coordination with the United Nations Mine Action Service, in
particular through exchanging and providing existing maps and any other relevant
information to the United Nations.” This was intended as an instruction to the
governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea to provide minefield maps, and did not impact the
MACC mandate

•

Resolution 1466 (2003), in which the Security Council “notes the work done by the
UNMEE Mine Action Coordination Centre in demining and education on risk related to
mines, and urges the parties to pursue efforts on mine clearance.” Again, this did not
affect the MACC mandate.

•

In more general terms, the President of the Security Council, in a statement dated
November 19, 2003, strongly supported mine action as an activity that "can play an
important role in peace-building and confidence-building in post-conflict situations."17
There seems, therefore, sufficient recognition in the Security Council of the importance of
mine action in relation to PKM activities.

3.1.1 Resolution 1320
Resolution 1320 seems, at first sight, relevant to the circumstances prevailing at the time. It
opened the door for the MACC to humanitarian mine action, particularly in terms of
coordination and provision of technical assistance. Aside from numerous casualties, the 19982000 border conflict resulted in countless displaced Eritreans, many from the TSZ. There was
a humanitarian disaster, calling for a humanitarian response.

17

Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, November 19, 2003,
S/prst/2003.22
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International humanitarian mine action NGOs18 had started operations at about the same time
as the arrival of the Peacekeeping Force, but there was a lack of oversight and a virtual
absence of national strategic mine action planning. The situation was complex, and
coordination of NGO activities proved problematic, partly because some NGOs may not have
been easily controllable, partly because there was no strong national mine action agency
capable of such coordination, and partly because the complexity of coordination was underestimated and the task was, in the view of various informants, simply not properly carried
out.19
In order to try to build a bridge to the Government, staff of the Eritrean Mine Action
Programme (EMAP); a fledgling government agency; were given accommodation on the
premises of the MACC. This appears to have underscored the need for a clear separation
between the UNMEE MACC and an independent national mine action entity. The token
presence of EMAP mine action staff on MACC premises was symptomatic of a lack of clear
vision and commitment, on the part of the Government, with respect to the establishment of a
strong and independent mine action agency fully representing Eritrean interests.
The location of EMAP on the premises of UNMEE MACC was a poor substitute for the need
to create local mine action capacity on its own. It is true that EMAP and UNOPS had signed a
formal MOU for capacity development including rental of the facility. It is also true that
UNDP was similarly housed in the compound. Yet, in hindsight, an over-arching agreement
with the Government specifying in detail the tasks of the MACC in terms of local mine action
capacity building, may have prevented subsequent problems and Government animosity. It
has turned out to be critical that a mine action centre under the mandate of a UN
Peacekeeping mission be guided by such a formal agreement. In a MACC paper dated
September 2003 it is stated:
“By stepping outside its mandate, without an official agreement between the Government and
UNMEE, the MACC increasingly lost focus of its originally mandated responsibilities…An
official agreement is crucial to avoid confusion…”20
The attempt to support the establishment of indigenous capacity is one of the most important
steps to be taken at the beginning of a Peacekeeping mission. The findings of the Study
Report of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs are relevant where it says
"…the UN focal point must take quick and early action to help national and local authorities
address the humanitarian implications of landmines. The realization of this objective cannot
be considered of lesser value than the organization of mine action activities focused on
addressing Peacekeeping operational needs. It is equally important that any activity or

18

HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, Danish Church Aid, and Mine Awareness Trust.
See also, for example, comments by HALO Trust in this respect, later in this report. As well, the
report on findings submitted by members of the MASG following their fieldtrip to Eritrea in May 2002
highlighted “The vital importance of transparent and constructive cooperation with all the mine action
partners, including NGO’s, has been stressed…” The concern seems to relate specifically to
coordination between the MACC and NGOs, as the next line stated that “cooperation and coordination
between the MACC and NGO’s is improving…”
20
Lessons Learned since 2000, September 2003, UNMEE MACC.
19
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capacity which is generated under the auspices of a UN mission form part of a coherent plan
focused on enabling national authorities meet long-term responsibilities."21
There is also the more fundamental question whether an entity such as the MACC, with
responsibilities to discharge directly, is a suitable vehicle for driving a capacity-building
effort. Abundant evidence exists from the field of international development that the
achievements of technical advisors often are disappointing and, in particular, often fail to
achieve much progress in developing the ‘high-level’ capacities required for managerial and
organisational performance. A contributing factor in many cases is the fact that, in spite of
their titles, advisors are often judged by whether the local organisation achieves observable
performance improvements. Often it is easier to improve organisational performance by doing
the job oneself rather than training others and hoping for the best, and many advisors fall into
the trap of ‘doing’ rather than ‘advising’, which then inhibits the capacities of local managers
by denying them the opportunity to do their own analysis, take decisions, and – a necessary
part of learning – make mistakes. Personnel in a MACC, having their own responsibilities for
tasking, QA, information management, and so on would be under even more pressure to do
jobs by themselves which, for the sake of capacity development, should be left to local
officials.
For this reason, it would be preferable if UNDP’s mandate for capacity development was
given greater emphasis from the start, rather than having its programme being subsumed, in
appearance at least, within the MACC. As subsequent events have shown, capacity building22
by the UNDP (an entity without links to the Peacekeeping Force) was much more acceptable
to the Government. We can extract a recommendation:
Any involvement of a peacekeeping mission, or an entity closely associated with a
peacekeeping mission, to support building of indigenous mine action capacity, should
generally be contemplated only with a full understanding and consideration of the
consequences. Such involvement should be subject to a clear and unambiguous
agreement between the UN and the Government at the highest level identifying mutual
commitments and responsibilities.
One can make another important, closely related, observation here, already alluded to earlier.
A mine action centre with close ties to the Peacekeeping Force was given a coordinating role
for humanitarian mine action that normally would be the responsibility of a national body. It
is clear from the experience in Eritrea that involvement of peacekeepers, or those closely
associated with the Peacekeeping Force, to achieve such an objective is not necessarily, nor
automatically, a good idea. Nor does it appear to have been warmly received by the Eritrean
Government authorities (as comments made earlier have intimated). While there are no
absolutes in this matter, and other Governments might have welcomed a coordinating role by
an entity with ties to a Peacekeeping Force, one should not assume that this is true for all
21

Study Report, The development of indigenous mine action capacities, UN Department of
Humanitarian Affairs, New York, 1997. p.27
22
As defined by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, capacity building (or capacity
development) is “…the process by which individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, and societies
increase their abilities to: (1) perform core functions, solve problems, define and achieve objectives;
and (2) understand and deal with their development needs in a broad context and in a sustainable
manner….”. Enhancing operational and technical capacities, while often necessary, clearly is
insufficient for the challenge of capacity development of organisations and (even more ambitious)
networks of organisations such as a national mine action programme.

13

Final, August 2005

circumstances. We, therefore, have to conclude again that an official agreement with the
Government at the highest level might have prevented subsequent problems that ultimately
resulted in the expulsion of mine action NGOs.23
In this context it may be useful to refer to the conclusions of a study conducted by the OECD
in 1998.24 It notes that the civilian sector, by virtue of its extensive experience, has a
comparative advantage in most aspects of the provision of humanitarian assistance. The study
mentions:
"The political realities that surround the involvement of the military make it an unpredictable
asset for humanitarian assistance operations in several ways. First, political constraints often
mean that military assets cannot be deployed until after the peak of a crisis has been reached.
Second, recent experience indicates that when militaries are deployed for humanitarian
purposes their involvement in security matters will be restricted. Finally, the use of the
military can at times politicise the delivery of humanitarian aid and threaten the neutrality,
impartiality and independence of that aid".25
By assigning the MACC coordinating responsibilities for humanitarian mine action, the
question as to which activities should be coordinated, and carried out by whom, were left
unanswered. Also unanswered was the question as to how this mandate would support Force
requirements. By defining the role of a civilian-run mine action centre associated with a
peacekeeping force, it would seem important to reflect on the comparative advantage such a
centre would have. As subsequent discussion in this report will elaborate, a civilian MACC is
fully familiar with IMAS, can ensure that demining operations are IMAS compatible, and can
train demining contingents in the application of IMAS. In addition, a civilian-run mine action
centre is not subject to short-term rotation, and has flexibility in subcontracting non-military
demining assets (NGOs, commercial firms) in order to establish the right “mix” of assets. At
the same time, lines of command are clear, and confusion with dual loyalty exhibited by
contingent deminers (loyalty to home country and loyalty to the Force Commander) are
avoided. Most importantly, a civilian-run mine action centre can propose mine action that
could address both Force requirements as well as community aspirations (see also discussion
below).
Resolution 1320 provided a perhaps tantalizing, but very incomplete, glimpse of the thinking
that went on during the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM). While we may look into the
deliberations of this mission for guidance, clearly defined terms of reference for the MACC,
especially with respect to coordination and capacity development, should have been prepared
for discussion with the Government, leading to a comprehensive agreement. We may
formulate another recommendation:
Activities of a Mine Action Centre resulting from a Security Council Resolution should
be defined in clear terms of reference, that can than be made the subject of an
overarching agreement with the Government concerned.
23

The Sri Lankan Government similarly objected to a role for the relevant mine action centre that
would encroach on non-military areas of responsibilities, whereas other governments have welcomed
such roles.
24
Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, Report No.1, Civilian and military means of
providing and supporting humanitarian assistance during conflict - Comparative Advantages and
Costs, OECD, Paris, 1998.
25
Ibid, page 32.
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With the developments of mid-2002, and the subsequent establishment of the Eritrean
Demining Authority which now decides demining priorities, the MACC's mandate resulting
from Resolution 1320 is no longer of much relevance. In fact, the MACC currently consults
very closely with EDA before embarking on demining tasks. It now only coordinates those
demining assets which fall under its own direct authority.
3.1.2 Resolution 1430
The second resolution deals only with support to demarcation, leaving many other mine
action responsibilities in a virtual grey zone. It takes a creative mind to carve out a meaningful
mandate when the resolution confines the MACC to clearing small staging areas and access
routes for the placement of demarcation pillars. The problem is further confounded by the
current demarcation stalemate. Strictly going by a literal interpretation of the official mandate,
then, the scope of work of the MACC is, at the moment, limited indeed.
The events of mid-2002 where the Eritrean authorities forcefully asserted themselves on the
local demining scene resulted in a re-evaluation of the MACC's role (see Chapter 4 for
details). The question arises whether, given the profoundly different circumstances prevailing
after Proclamation 123, the dimensions of the MACC’s responsibilities should have been
revisited by the Security Council; especially since the MACC’s original coordinating mandate
had become largely irrelevant. There is no indication that this was done. The current boundary
stalemate does not help things.
It is recommended that, in defining the mandate of a civilian mine action coordination
centre attached to a peacekeeping mission, considerable effort be made to outline, for
Security Council deliberations, the general scope of the MACC’s responsibilities within
the evolving context of political, humanitarian and peacekeeping realities, and in line
with the MACC’s comparative advantage.

3.2

Peacekeeping Objectives

Realizing that the Security Council Resolutions only partially indicate UNMEE MACC
responsibilities, we are left with the task of finding out more about what these responsibilities
entail. In doing so, our starting point will have to be the fact that the MACC's essential task is,
first and foremost, to support the force component of the Peacekeeping Mission (see textbox
on Mission versus Force objectives). If we can identify the objectives of the Peacekeeping
Forces, we can then deduce the scope of work relevant to the MACC.
Textbox 1 – Mission versus Force Objectives
The presence of international military forces with a peacekeeping mandate is the defining feature of a
peacekeeping mission, but there are other components to such missions such as political, public
relations, and administrative. Normally, the peacekeeping mission will have a broader mandate than
the peacekeeping forces.
In the Secretary General’s Report to the Security Council (S/2000/785), leading to Security Council’s
Resolution 1320, the statement is made on page 3 that “the mandate of the expanded United Nations
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea would be to:” – it then gives nine points including “(h) Coordinate and
provide technical assistance for humanitarian mine action activities in the temporary security zone and
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areas adjacent to it;” Later on the same page it notes…“UNMEE would be composed of political,
military, public information, mine action and administrative components.” Thus, the Secretary
General’s report lists nine aspects of the UNMEE (i.e. “mission”) mandate and has mine action as a
distinct UNMEE component, not subsumed within the military component. Thus, it appears the intent
was to have an UNMEE ‘Mission MACC’, not an UNMEE ‘Force MACC’. This point was emphasised
repeatedly by some officers in UNMAS headquarters (although not the personnel based in Eritrea).
However, the Security Council Resolution itself states:
“Authorizes the deployment within UNMEE of up to 4,200 troops, including up to 220 military
observers, until March 2001, with a mandate to:” […the same 9 points including (h) relating to
humanitarian mine action.]
In the eyes of the evaluators, the Security Council Resolution established the Peacekeeping Force
component of UNMEE and places the humanitarian mine action component under that force’s
mandate, even though this is not fully consistent with the Secretary General’s report. Of course, the
Force is a component of the mission and, in that sense, a MACC reporting to the Force Commander
supports the mission’s mandates.* However – and for good reasons – the scope of action of
international military forces is typically defined in precise terms and (as illustrated most dramatically by
Bosnia and Rwanda) Force commanders are expected to adhere to these limits even if mayhem is
unfolding before their eyes.
Regardless of the intent implied in the Secretary General’s Report, given the reporting structures
actually created by the Security Council Resolution the fundamental question to be asked is “how can
the MACC best serve Force and Mission objectives?”
Mission objectives include, to: (i) promote the successful conclusion of the peace process (ii) monitor
the TSZ; (iii) ensure coordination of UN efforts in delivering humanitarian assistance, monitoring
human rights, promoting mine awareness education and demining activities in the zone; (iv) chair the
MCC; and (v) provide administrative and logistical support to the EEBC. Force objectives are a sub-set
of mission objectives. The latter, therefore, include the four goals for this Force as outlined by the
Force Commander, to: (i) stay informed; (ii) win confidence of the two governments; (iii) ensure
mobility for the troops; and (iv) win the hearts and minds of the people. In the case of Eritrea at least,
the Commander’s “hearts and minds” goal appears to be ample room for the MACC to target mine
action activities to support the Mission objective of coordinating UN efforts in delivering humanitarian
assistance.
* UNMAS has pointed-out that the MACC Programme Manager reports to the DSRSG on policy matters, and to
the Force Commander concerning operations. This arrangement is not necessarily inconsistent with the
Resolution given that some mechanism above the PKF is needed at least to identify requirements for
“…humanitarian mine action activities in the temporary security zone and areas adjacent to it” and to discuss how
to address these requirements. However, the view that the MACC was established as a part of the Mission
distinct from the Peacekeeping Force component seems inconsistent with the Security Council Resolution. At the
very least, this contributed to the confusion over the authorised mandate of the MACC.
(Sources: Secretary General’s report to the Security Council (S/2000/785); Security Council Resolution (S/RES/1320 of 2000); Substantive
guidance to the Mission by the USG in April 2004)

What are the objectives of the Force? In a discussion with the Force Commander, Major
General Rajender Singh, the Evaluation Team learned that the objectives can be formulated
briefly as follows:
1) Stay fully informed of all events in the peacekeeping zone, i.e. keep eyes and ears
open;
2) Win the confidence of the two governments involved, and be respectful of the cultures
of the two nations;
3) Ensure mobility for the troops; and
4) Win the hearts and minds of the people.
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The pursuit of objectives 3 and 4 are especially important for the MACC. Road clearance is
now being provided by a commercial demining company, Mechem, which has a worldwide
reputation. The services of Mechem now ensure safe troop mobility in a cost-effective
manner, and directly support objective 3 (see also Chapter 9 in this respect).
It is objective 4 that offers interesting scope for MACC support. In order to try to achieve the
objective of winning hearts and minds of the local population, the Force is engaged in Quick
Impact Projects (QIPs) for villagers. Such projects may include the building of small water
reservoirs, wells, etc. It was outside the Evaluation Team's mandate to examine these small
projects, and to determine to what extent such projects are integrated into demining activities,
if at all. The Evaluation Team feels, however, that strategic demining activities on the part of
the MACC, combined with QIPs, could certainly go a long way in helping the Peacekeeping
Force to achieve this objective. One could envisage an enhanced scope of activities for
UNMEE MACC that would include the inclusion of specific and strategic QIPs in a demining
programme that would not only support the Peacekeeping Forces directly, but also bring
important secondary benefits to communities.
It is recommended that the mandate of a civilian Mine Action Coordination Centre
within a peacekeeping mission be enhanced by tying it very closely to the objectives of
the Peacekeeping Force itself (and perhaps those of the broader mission26), necessitating
a careful analysis of ways in which the MACC can satisfy basic aspirations of the people
in the region in line with the Force’s goals.
Of interest in this respect is the fact that this enhanced role for the MACC would not only
address Force requirements, but also Mission requirements in terms of “ensuring the
coordination of UN efforts in the delivery of humanitarian assistance”27

3.3 Command and Control Structure
In attempting to define a basic model for a MACC supporting a peacekeeping mission, there
is not only the question of enhanced mandate as suggested above, but also the issue of
management. Of particular importance here is the relationship between a civilian-run MACC
and demining contingents belonging to the Force.
The confusion that may arise from trying to coordinate two parallel demining activities has
been admirably resolved by integrating the Force Mine Action Centre (FMAC) with the
UNMEE MACC, without disrupting the authority of the Force Commander. Of importance is
that the two parties share common premises for ease of communication. FMAC has placed its
staff under the same roof as UNMEE MACC, sharing office space in the MACC compound.
The decision-making process is as simple as it is ingenious. The programme manager of
MACC proposes priorities to the Force commander, who then approves/adjusts the proposal
26

It may well be that situating mine action as a distinct component of a peacekeeping mission, rather
than an element of the peacekeeping force component, would simplify matters. However, it might also
complicate working relationships to the demining units supplied by TCCs or lead to divisions within the
mission concerning the relative priorities accorded to demining to support, say, force mobility and
humanitarian efforts. Regardless, if UNMEE and UNMAS wished Mine Action to be a distinct
component, they should have had this reflected in subsequent Security Council Resolutions to give
themselves the clear authority to operate in such a fashion.
27
Guidance to the Mission by the USG in April 2004 to prepare for the next budget cycle ’05-‘06

17

Final, August 2005

and directs his troops accordingly. The structure also benefits from the already existing access
to two sources of funds: the Voluntary Trust Fund of UNMAS and the UNMEE Assessed
Contribution budget. This double funding access has ensured that the MACC has been, and
continues to be, adequately resourced. The integration of the two demining capabilities has
earned the MACC a UN 21 award.
UNMEE MACC is the first MACC to be integrated into a Peacekeeping Mission and could
serve as a template for future Peacekeeping Missions requiring mine action. The lesson
learned is that
The integration of civil and military mine action assets under a joint mine action
structure, fully respecting Force authority, is an efficient and effective way to plan and
execute a mine action response within a Peacekeeping Mission.
We now have the basic ingredients of a potentially very effective mine action centre attached
to a Peacekeeping Mission. The model is an integrated one, fully respects the Force
Commander's authority, and functions strictly in support of the Mission's objectives. In order
to be effective, it requires a clearly defined mandate that addresses two of the fundamental
concerns of the Force: mobility and satisfaction of the local population. Winning the hearts
and minds of the population offers a much wider scope for mine action than currently existing
Security Council resolutions would tend to indicate.
A complicating factor of an integrated operation is the limited authority the MACC enjoys as
a coordinating body. The MOUs with individual TCCs do not give the MACC the necessary
mandate to establish performance requirements, or to require military demining units to
follow IMAS-compatible technical and safety standards. These MOUs are merely financial
documents stating that reimbursement will be given for personnel/equipment provided. They
do not include specifications as how to operate. In the view of the evaluation team, this is a
serious shortcoming. It means that the MACC, as a coordinating body, cannot guarantee a
uniform clearance standard in its area of responsibility. Even the Force Commander does not
have the mandate to force a contingent to apply standards issued by the MACC, and to change
equipment if it is considered to be inappropriate to achieve required clearance standards.28
The military demining units do not submit IMSMA completion reports to the MACC in which
the particular senior representative formally declares that the area cleared is free of landmines
and UXO. Commercial companies such as Ronco and Mechem operating in the same area
have to report on the standardized IMSMA form and have therefore to take responsibility for
the results (full clearance of land) of their work.29
Tasking orders selected and agreed upon with the local demining authority (EDA) have to go
through the military chief of operations down to the respective contingent commander. They
can reject these tasking orders if they are considered inappropriate or inconsistent with the
particular national regulations. This makes long-term planning for the MACC difficult.
Integration of management does not necessarily resolve the question as to how tasks can, and
should, be assigned. A recommendation by the authors of an internal UNMEE audit to include

28
29

LtCol Fernand Dias Martins, e-mail to Johannes Dirscherl dated November 19, 2004
See also Chapter 8.3.2 in this respect.
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humanitarian demining into MACC's activities was rejected by UNMEE.30 It was felt that
"demining conducted beyond Force protection and mobility is first and foremost an
operational exercise that increases TCC demining capacity and the proper integration of
various UN demining actors and capabilities".31 Of importance here are (i) the comparative
advantage of a commercial /civilian-run entity in most aspects of the provision of demining
assistance; and (ii) the inherent lack of capacity of Force demining assets to work efficiently,
and cost-effectively. To quote again from the earlier mentioned OECD study:32
"Civilian assets are, in general, more cost-effective. Military means, which are designed to be
fail-safe rather than efficient, will cost more task-by-task than civilian means. Moreover, the
cost of the military providing security for large humanitarian assistance operations will be
significantly greater than the cost of providing assistance itself. "
At the same time, commanding officers prefer to have military demining assets available in
their area of operations, in spite of the fact that they may be grossly under-utilized and
expensive. An added consideration is that contingent deminers contribute to a sense of
security for the local population. Their mandate is peace building, their presence generates
confidence. The very least that should be done, then, is to ensure that contingent deminers
work towards internationally accepted standards and employ the right mechanical and manual
equipment.
The recognition of separate comparative advantages of military versus commercial and other
civil demining assets, managed under a joint structure, would have to acknowledge the
mutually reinforcing nature of the respective capacities. Thus, road clearance for the
protection of the Peacekeeping Force and the enhancement of military mobility would also
result in safety for the civilian population. The mutually reinforcing nature of the partnership
also extends to the assurance of quality and the preservation of the right operating standards.
Without a clear mandate for the MACC, the introduction and maintenance of International
Mine Action Standards for TCC demining contingents present a formidable challenge, an area
requiring special attention. In this respect it is important to recall a statement by the President
of the Security Council:33
“The Security Council recognizes the contribution that peacekeeping personnel can make in
the areas of mine risk education and demining and calls upon troop-contributing countries,
where appropriate, to train selected personnel to demine in accordance with the International
Mine Action Standards.”
The following recommendations are offered:
UNMAS should be actively involved in the planning for peacekeeping missions,
including the definition of mission requirements, and work with the Force-generating
unit in areas of equipment planning and establishment of standards.

30

OIOS Audit No. AP2004/624/03: Demining Operations in UNMEE, UN Office of Internal Oversight
Services Internal Audit Division, September 29, 2004
31
Ibid. page 5.
32
Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation, Report No.1, Civilian and Military Means of
Providing and Supporting Humanitarian Assistance During Conflict, OECD, Paris, 1998, page 32.
33
Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, November 19, 2003,
S/prst/2003.22
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Mission requirements should be reviewed on an agreed basis and schedule to assess
whether comparative advantages of military versus commercial and other civilian mine
action entities have shifted.
A MOU with a TCC covering the operation of a demining contingent should include
specifications on how to operate, and on the authority of a MACC to ensure IMAS
compatibility.
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Chapter 4 – Mine Action Programme Development
Mine action activities in Eritrea may be roughly divided into two separate components: the
programme elements managed by the UNMEE MACC focusing on the TSZ and adjacent
areas, and the programme elements under the authority of the national EDA. The latter’s
mandate is nation-wide but its five EDO teams as well as the commercial deminer Ronco
which reports to EDA similarly operate primarily in the TSZ. EDA is strongly supported by
the UNDP through its Mine Action Capacity Building Programme (MACBP), and works
closely with UNICEF in Mine Risk Education. A brief summary of both programmes is
provided below.34

4.1

Summary of the UNMEE MACC Programme

The MACC was established in August 2000 by UNMAS, utilizing UNOPS as the executing
agency and with funds from the UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund. Consistent with a liberal
interpretation of its original mandate from the Security Council, the UNMEE MACC
programme addressed the emergency landmine problem in the TSZ, attempted to coordinate
the various humanitarian mine action players active in the country at that time, and supported
the Eritrean Government in establishing and strengthening an indigenous mine action
capability (EMAP).
A “Strategy for UN Assistance in Mine Action in Eritrea” was approved in November 2001
outlining a number of broad goals including:
o strengthening of indigenous mine action capacity,
o establishment of a comprehensive information base for mine action upon
which to base a sound national strategy,
o establishment of national standards and a quality assurance capacity,
o reduction of the impact of the landmine/UXO threat on the population, and
o mobilisation of adequate resources for mine action.
This was an ambitious agenda requiring a great deal of energy and commitment, both of
which are much in evidence as the output seems to indicate.
4.1.1 The period before mid-2002
Progress reports indicate that much was achieved during the first two years. By June 30, 2002,
the UNMEE MACC was fully staffed with eleven international positions filled. All positions
were financed under the UNMEE Assessed Budget for July 1, 2001 through June 30, 2002
under the MOA concluded between the UN and UNOPS. Any periods of service prior to July
1, 2001 were funded from other sources of income. By the middle of 2002, the program also
employed 22 national staff working in different sections of the UNMEE MACC financed by
the Voluntary Trust Fund.
34

The TORs of the Evaluation Team did not call for an evaluation of UNDP’s Mine Action Capacity
Building Programme, but given the Team had to “analyze the relationship” between the MACC and
this programme, the subject is treated here to provide a more inclusive picture of mine action in
Eritrea, and to illustrate the shift in responsibilities that occurred in mid-2002.
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The focus of mine action during the first year of operation (2001) was on mine risk education
(MRE) and mine clearance in the TSZ, thus supporting the return of refugees and IDPs, as
well as supporting UN peacekeeping activities. During 2001, the UNMEE MACC established
the in-country Technical Safety Standards (TSS) for Eritrea, and worked with EMAP to
establish accreditation and licensing procedures for all operators working in mine action.
IMSMA was installed, an important achievement in spite of subsequent growing pains. The
database was able to produce landmine/UXO area maps which were provided to all
organisations and agencies working in the TSZ. Formally authorized in writing by EMAP,
UNMEE MACC implemented a quality control and quality assurance system that allowed
monitoring the work of clearance operations in the TSZ. Other achievements included
substantial work on Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs), establishment of two sector
offices, production of various documents proposing UNMEE MACC support for the
Boundary Commission, and more.
Much effort was devoted in trying to build EMAP into a national mine action organization.
For this purpose, UNOPS concluded a MOA with EMAP from January through August 2002
to provide continued support for staffing, rent, operations, equipment and logistics. Training
was provided to EMAP with respect to accreditation, quality assurance, standard operating
procedures, technical safety standards based on IMAS, etc.
In addition UNOPS extended an existing contract with the former Eritrean Demining Agency
(EDA-1) for three manual clearance teams (consisting of 60 deminers per team) to work in the
TSZ. MACC and Danish Church Aid (DCA) provided assistance to EDA-1 for both
headquarters and field team activities and international supervisors were appointed to monitor
and oversee the work of the three teams.35 During the first half of 2002, the three EDA-1
teams cleared close to 700,000 square meters of contaminated land, destroyed 186 mines and
1,430 UXO.
Much effort was spent renovating and upgrading the National Training Centre (NTC), with a
US$250,000 contribution by GTZ. UNOPS assisted the MACC in conducting a tender and
issuing a contract for this purpose, and the works were completed under budget. The MACC
provided instructor support to the NTC, including the training and professional development
of thirteen national instructors. The MACC also conducted numerous mine action related
courses at the NTC for representatives of all mine action agencies in Eritrea, but primarily for
EDA-1 staff.
On April 29, 2002, UNOPS awarded a contract to UXB Africa (Pty) for route clearance,
(using Assessed Budget funds) for an initial period of six months. This contract was extended
by another six months. The quality Assurance section fully deployed to the field during the
first half of 2002; the development of technical safety standards and SOPs for quality
assurance was completed; mechanical and mine detection dogs test areas were established at
the NTC and used for accreditation of clearance operators’ assets. The Information Section
continued the development and maintenance of IMSMA in support of data requirements of
different parties.

35

UNMAS, through the MACC, provided substantial funding support to DCA to commence their
operations in Eritrea due to funding problems DCA experienced during their deployment phase.
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MRE activities were flourishing. A UNICEF MRE trainer completed the training of teachers
and community facilitators in MRE and the preparation of in-country MRE training manuals.
Landmine posters, handouts, educational children games, and other educational materials
were distributed. MRE was introduced to schools through the Ministry of Education, and
some 268 teachers were trained by MRE instructors from the NTC. In collaboration with
UNICEF and the Department of Radio and the Ministry of Information, a national MRE radio
program was launched. A number of international NGOs and commercial companies were
participating in the implementation of MRE programs, in addition to the implementation of
their respective mine clearance operations.36 UNICEF had seconded an MRE officer to the
MACC since the early stages of the programme who worked with EMAP and other ministries
on MRE capacity building.
In other words, there was a flurry of intense and important activity on the part of the MACC,
in collaboration with other parties, before the events of mid-2002 put an abrupt end to it. It is
most likely that the uncoordinated demining efforts of the various players at that time, alluded
to in the previous chapter, contributed to the President’s decision to start with a clean slate.
HALO Trust was particularly scathing of the MACC’s performance in terms of coordination,
but criticism was voiced by others as well. For example, in discussions between a member of
the evaluation team and Dutch Government officials in The Hague, considerable dismay was
expressed by the officials concerning the failure of the MACC to convene regular
coordinating meeting among the various players.37 The members of the MASG fieldtrip to
Eritrea in May 2002 felt the need to emphasise “The vital importance of transparent and
constructive cooperation with all the mine action partners, including NGOs.” During a MASG
meeting on 5 September 2002 in New York, the representative of DCA noted that “In Eritrea,
coordination between UN, NGO’s and the donors has been missing”.38 Similarly, DCA noted
that “The UN MACC in Eritrea has failed in planning, tasking and coordination”39 The
HALO Trust Programme Manager during that time stated: “I really doubt if a claim can be
made that the UNMEE MACC really coordinated mine action in the TSZ in anything other
than a basic sense”.40
In defence of MACC’s Programme Manager,41 however, it must be said that UNMAS was
remiss by not: (i) concluding a relevant overarching agreement with the Government giving
clear legitimacy and limits to the coordinating role; (ii) providing a clear overall strategy for
36

They included HALO Trust, Danish Church Aid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mine
Awareness Trust (MAT), Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), Ronco and Minetech.
37
The Dutch Government was a major contributor to HALO in Eritrea.
38
Notes to the members of Mine Action Support Group (MASG). Presented to the reinforced MASG
meeting on 5 September 2002 in New York. Page 1.
39
IBID. Page 3.
40
Comment on questionnaire asking “In your view, was mine action performed by the respective
NGOs well coordinated?”
41
It is not the role of an evaluation team to assess individual performance (“Evaluators are not
expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this
general principle.” Norms for Evaluation in the UN System, Para. 11.5; Standards for Evaluation in the
UN System, para. 20, both issued by the UN Evaluation Group, April 2005). However, some highly
charged and personalised statements were made in writing, both at the time of the expulsion notice
and in response to our questionnaire, and we feel it necessary to point out the simple fact that
individual employees function as part of larger organisations and it is important – indeed essential in
such a politicised environment as Eritrea – that the various levels of that organisation discharge their
respective responsibilities.
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the MACC to exercise its mandate; and (iii) defining precise terms of reference for the MACC
to substantiate a coordinating role. Instead, as was intimated in the previous chapter, the
MACC was left to manage much on its own, and to define its own role, apparently with scant
guidance from headquarters. Of relevance is the comment by a DCA representative in this
respect: “UN MACC in Eritrea has been searching high and low the last year for a
mandate”.42 In the view of the evaluation team, the ultimate cause of the MACC’s relative
failure in coordination can be found in the absence of a clearly defined mandate, the
preparation of which would certainly be the responsibility of UNMAS in New York.
Most serious of all was the failure to identify the mounting irritation of the President that
resulted in Proclamation 123; a gathering storm that some of the NGOs claim they saw
coming.43 The evaluation team did not find any evidence that UNMAS anticipated the
Proclamation, nor that it took appropriate action to prevent the outburst (see also box
containing a summary of HALO Trust’s views, below and, in a separate box, a summary of a
statement from UNMAS covering the same period).
At the same time, it must be said that certain NGOs are notoriously difficult to coordinate,
and resent UN interference in their affairs. Compounding this is the threat of competing
demands for donor funds, with NGOs fearing that such funds may be channelled to the UN
rather than to their own NGO activities.44
Textbox 2 – Summary of HALO Trust Comments
In responding to a questionnaire submitted by the Evaluation Team, HALO Trust expressed its deep frustration
with the coordinating activities of UNMEE MACC before the issuance of Proclamation 123 in mid-2002. HALO’s
representatives considered the MACC’s coordination efforts a failure. There were no UNMEE MACC or JMACC
tasking plans, nor was there a viable tasking process. The UNMEE MACC did not focus on its primary mandate –
coordination within the TSZ – but rather it attempted to develop capacity for a national programme without
consulting others working in mine action, with overlapping intentions. HALO Trust found the relationship with the
UNMEE MACC ‘highly irritating.’ It felt that the mine action process was not inclusive and, as a stakeholder in the
process, it felt routinely ignored. For example, according to HALO Trust, monthly JMACC coordination meetings
on purely operational issues started only in 2002, upon the initiative of HALO Trust. HALO Trust felt that
‘coordination implicitly demands the coordinator to listen, discuss, argue, and demonstrate vision...Coordination is
not about secrecy, arrogance, position, or control.’
The expulsion order by the Government of Eritrea reportedly came as no surprise. What was going to happen
was ‘clearly sign posted.’ HALO Trust argued, immediately after the order, that the UNMEE MACC should return
to its mandate. It argued, among other things, that EMAP (or by that stage EDA) could meet the challenge and
‘did not need the UN-imposed UNMEE MACC to tell it how to do it.’
HALO does not believe that an Eritrean Government document exists – ‘appropriately dated’ – that empowered
the MACC to build a national programme. UNMEE MACC ignored the fact that the Dutch Government assumed
that it was doing some of this through a US$4 million programme with the HALO Trust and EMAP. ‘At the very
least, why did the UNMEE MACC not consult formally with the HALO Trust and the Dutch Embassy?’
HALO Trusts makes the comment: ‘Had the UNMEE MACC concentrated on coordination then we might all have
achieved something…What happened instead is that the UNMEE MACC would appear to have concentrated on
42

Notes to the members of Mine Action Support Group (MASG). Presented to the reinforced meeting
on 5 September 2002 in New York. Page 3.
43
This may represent more the benefits of hindsight than prescience, but HALO Trust programme
manager did ask the HALO Director (who knew President Afworki personally) to come to Eritrea in
August 2002, apparently because he saw trouble looming. Some representatives of other NGOs which
worked closely with the MACC were taken by surprise by the expulsion, and questioned whether the
MACC – which had greater access to the government – was effective in defending their programmes.
44
The boxed statement from UNMAS indicates it has learned the lesson that coordination problems
should be “quickly addressed in the future, by effective communication, compromise, and an inclusive
approach with all partners”.
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building a UN programme to a template that was simply inappropriate to the way mine action had and was
evolving in Eritrea.’ HALO’s belief is that ‘when the Eritrean Government discovered that their national authority
EMAP had allowed itself to be drawn into the UNMEE MACC process, they simply moved to close the whole
show down’.
HALO feels that ‘there was a failure to understand or demonstrate any passing understanding of the historical
relationship between EPLF (the liberation movement that was the precursor to the Eritrean Government) and the
UN…The UN is arguably not held in high regard by Eritrea for its actions in the 30 years after 1945’.
Source: Comments by HALO Trust in response to a questionnaire by the evaluation team.

Textbox 3 – Comments by UNMAS covering the same chain-of-events
UNMAS addressed in particular the HALO allegations concerning “(1) what HALO saw as UNMAS’
unilateral decision to help build a national programme, and (2) the MACC’s poor effort in the area of
coordination” which they see as integral elements of all UNMAS programmes.
“While the extent of the landmine problem was not clear in 2000, it was widely recognized that it could
not be resolved in a few years and that a national response would be required. This was agreed with
the Eritrean authorities and included in the report that led to the establishment of UNMEE. The
strategy was made operational with the assistance of the Commissioner of the Commission for
Cooperation with the Peacekeeping Mission (CCPM) and the Deputy Commissioner for Mine Action,
who was later appointed Director of the Eritrean Mine Action Programme (EMAP), and it formed the
basis of signed agreements between the UN and the Government of Eritrea to support EMAP. This
requirement for a national programme was also clearly stated by the Commissioner to the Mine Action
Support Group in New York on 19 November 2001. The decision to develop a national programme,
therefore, was not unilaterally taken by UNMAS. Significant capacity was developed by the MACC and
NGO partners such as HALO during that period, capacity that has been an integral part of Eritrean
mine action efforts under leadership of the Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA).
On the issue of coordination, the comments of the two former HALO Programme Managers depict an
ineffective and at times obstructive MACC. The clearance and MRE statistics, populated IMSMA
database and quality assurance reports for that period tell a different story. Coordination in mine action
is aimed at enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of activities by reducing duplication; providing a
central point for information collation and analysis, requests for assistance and tasks prioritisation,
based on availability and capability of assets; monitoring adherence to agreed standards; integrating
activities; and interfacing with national authorities on mine-related issues. This is never easy or
straightforward, given the number of competing requirements of the broad range of actors involved,
including the government, UN organizations, donors, NGOs, and the local population. Therefore, it is
inevitable that differences of opinion will arise from time to time. This was unfortunately the case in
Eritrea between the UN and HALO Trust. The experience has taught a valuable lesson in ensuring
that such problems are quickly addressed in the future, by effective communication, compromise, and
an inclusive approach with all partners.”
Source: Written comments submitted to the evaluation team in May, 2005.

While there is some concordance between the HALO and UNMAS positions (e.g., both point
to differences of opinion concerning coordination and to the need for speedy resolution of
these in future), the common ground is scant relative to the ocean of difference. On some
points the statements of the other NGOs appear to corroborate the allegations of HALO Trust.
But these statements also convey a sense of betrayal that HALO Trust did not join in a
coordinated effort to salvage a more acceptable outcome to the crisis, choosing instead to
negotiate its own reprieve (plus an expansion of its programme). An individual familiar with
MASG deliberations during the period offered the opinion that at least some of the important
allegations made by HALO were, at their core, correct, but the tone of the correspondence
from HALO, the personalised nature of some of the allegations, and the suspicions occasioned
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by HALO’s announced expansion45 meant that the MASG members were loathe to press the
issue, at least once they had assurances from the Eritrean government that it would not require
the departing NGOs to turn-over their equipment and that future demining operations would
be IMAS-compliant.
Thus, there are seemingly few concrete repercussions within the wider mine action
community to this traumatic and costly event, which in all probability has negatively affected
the prospects of Eritreans living in, or seeking to return to, mine affected regions. One
outcome was that the Director of UNMAS undertook to hold more regular dialogues with the
international mine action NGOs, some of which coalesced into a more cohesive network that
subsequently took on the name NGO Perspectives on the Debris of War. This continues to
express concern over the role of UN agencies in coordination of mine action, emphasising
largely the same points as were made following the expulsion order in Eritrea.46
The evaluation team is not in a position to pronounce on how to allocate responsibility for
failing to recognise and appropriately manage the risks to mine action activities in Eritrea
during 2002. In part this is because the information provided47 does not ‘triangulate’, but
more fundamentally because of the absence of direct input from Eritrean authorities regarding
their perceptions and motivations at the time, or whether they felt their actions, in hindsight,
were even based on accurate information.
4.1.2 The period after mid-2002
The Government of Eritrea issued a proclamation in mid-2002 thoroughly changing the mine
action picture in the country.48 EMAP was dissolved, the Eritrean Demining Agency became
EDO with only some slight staffing changes. The Eritrean Demining Authority was
established, taking over from EMAP, and international NGOs were asked to leave. By the end
of September that year, only HALO Trust remained (it left less than a year later) and the
commercial company Ronco continued operations (and is still there).
By order of the Government, all activities of MACC in support of EMAP stopped abruptly.
Responsibility for UN capacity building shifted to UNDP and UNICEF. The departure of the
NGOs also meant that the MACC’s coordinating responsibilities of humanitarian demining
were no longer relevant, except in so far as UNMEE MACC’s own demining assets were
concerned. With the loss of important humanitarian demining activities in the TSZ, and the
serious curtailment of its responsibilities by the Government, the MACC had to re-examine its
role. It did so without wasting time.

45

HALO Trust explained that the government-imposed reduction in salaries within the mine action
sector allowed it to engage more staff with its existing project budget. The expansion was never fully
implemented.
46
For example, “Our experience is that these MACs are confused in their role of responsibilities, have
inadequate skills of personnel, are partially implementing, have insufficient oversight of field
programmes and programme staff by New York, lack transparency and manage IMSMA incorrectly
and unsustainably.” Presentation to the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group by Steven Olejas,
DanChurchAid on behalf of the NGO Perspectives on the Debris of War, 10 February, 2004.
47
Most was provided only after the Evaluation Report was “finalized”. Once again, the evaluation team
originally did not intend to focus on the issues surrounding the expulsion order, and the Terms of
Reference did not even provide for visits to the headquarters of the NGOs affected.
48
Proclamation 123/2002, of July 8, 2002.
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The MACC submitted a revised work plan which was approved by DPKO, UNMAS and
UNMEE at the end of October, 2002. The following changes were implemented:49
•
•

•
•
•

•
•

The Quality Assurance (QA) section was amalgamated with the Operations section
allowing the reduction of two international positions;
The Peacekeeping Force (PKF), Mine Awareness Cell (MACE) and Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) officer and the UN Military Observers (UNMO) Mine
Risk Education (MRE) cell were relocated to the MACC compound and combined
with elements of the MACC Operations section to form the Force Mine Action
Centre (FMAC);
The FMAC would be responsible for prioritisation and issuance of all UNMEE
mine action tasks including demining, EOD and MRE tasks;
An EOD emergency response team was formed to conduct EOD training for the
PKF EOD assets, and respond to major emergency EOD tasks within the TSZ;
Two MACC Regional Liaison Offices were established in the western and central
sectors. The MACC staff in these offices assumed responsibility for all sector mine
action coordination, QA and monitoring of any mine action activity within their
sectors;
Two emergency MRE teams were recruited and deployed in sectors west and
centre to work with PKF mine action operational elements working in those
sectors;
Only indirect capacity building support would be provided by the MACC to the
national program, and only through UNDP and UNICEF.

It should be emphasized that:
The revised MACC work plan was a creative and appropriate response to the
unexpected and drastic decisions of the Eritrean Government in mid-2002. It resulted, in
fact, in increased efficiency of UNMEE MACC operations by integrating military
demining assets into a civilian-run mine action centre.
The new work plan significantly had to limit the scope of activities of UNMEE MACC.
Coordination of humanitarian demining was greatly reduced by the expulsion of NGOs and
the intention of the Government to assume full control over mine action in the nation without
UNMEE MACC’s help. The numerous details involved in mine action capacity building were
shifted to the UNDP, with only support to EDA’s embryonic information technology, and
medical support, left as MACC tasks. This shift left important spare capacity. With the current
stalemate in boundary demarcation, not much action can be taken by the MACC beyond the
continuation of access road clearance and activities related to demarcation.50 In short, then,
we can say that the MACC’s wings were clipped in comparison to the first two-year period.
During the period 2003 and 2004 noteworthy events included the replacement of UXB
(because of a new requirement being identified for rapid route clearance) by Mechem. The
latter, by all accounts, is one of the world’s top demining companies in its specific genre.
UNOPS entered into a contract with Mechem for the period August 19, 2003 to April 7, 2004,
49

Annual Report 2002, Emergency Mine Action Assistance in Eritrea and Ethiopia, MACC.
Some of the tasks include, but are not limited to, reconnaissance, liaison with both countries military
assets in the area of responsibility, vital training of PKF demining assets for the specific demarcation
tasks, and clearance activities in areas calculated as possible pillar sites.
50
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which has been extended since then. Mechem manages to clear some 15 km of road a day,
less if the sensitivity of the sensors are adjusted to generate more signals. With the departure
of the Slovak assets during the first half of 2004 (see Chapter 8), UNMEE agreed to utilize
commercial mechanical support through UNOPS, instead of replacing the Slovak contingent
with one from another TCC. UNOPS tendered a new contract and Mechem was awarded the
extra work. The additional contract with Mechem was signed in September 2004 for the
supply of four integrated demining teams, to be deployed in January 2005. UNOPS is to be
commended for the selection process and its efficiency in concluding contractual
arrangements.
The Slovak demining contingent ceased operations at the end of May 2004 and departed the
Mission area a month later. As the next chapter discusses in more detail, productivity of the
Slovaks left much to be desired. The shift from a demining contingent to a commercial
demining company (Mechem) turned out to be very cost-effective indeed (see Chapter 9).
An important achievement was the establishment of a demining coordination centre in Shilalo
in Sector West for the purpose of centralising and improving all operational, monitoring and
training activities of PKF demining assets in the field.
Quality assurance work was conducted on PKF demining assets, with mixed results as far as
the Bangladeshi contingent is concerned (see chapter 8).
The information section continued to develop its competence by creating add-on programmes
to overcome deficiencies in IMSMA. It became a powerful support service to all mine action
activities in the nation, especially the fledgling EDA, EDO, and the commercial deminers
Ronco and Mechem (see Chapter 7).
The two MACC MRE field teams were regularly deployed either to sector west or sector
centre, and offered valuable assistance to a large number of communities residing in the TSZ,
while supporting the operational tasks of the MACC EOD field team and the PKF demining
teams.
The Medical Coordination Cell of the MACC, staffed by a medical coordinator supplied by
the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) continues to ensure that the demining medical
support capacity of all PKF demining contingents and MACC field operators – including the
MACC EOD and MRE field teams and Mechem – is adequate. The work involves regular
monitoring assessments and the conduct of various medical training courses.
In-house training courses are organised by the MACC Training Cell under management of the
Programme and Training Officer. The aim is to provide all MACC staff with opportunities to
various training programmes planned and executed with selected staff participation, including
computer training, report writing, a train-the-trainers HIV/AIDS course, human rights and
conflict resolution, etc.
Much useful work has been done during the last two years, but the scope of activities of
UNMEE MAC has diminished (see Chapter 6 for staffing implications) compared to the
period before the Government Proclamation 123 of July 8, 2002.
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4.2

EDA and Mine Action Capacity Development

UNDP support to mine action in Eritrea started with the arrival of the Chief Technical
Advisor in February 2002, temporarily accommodated on the UNMEE MACC premises.
Shortly thereafter the Senior Technical Advisor for the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS)
arrived. Various agreements were signed in April, 2002 (the original MACBP project
document, the agreement between UNDP and UNOPS, the agreement between UNDP and
EMAP) and the capacity building in EMAP was initiated.51
The issuance of Proclamation 123 in July 2002 contributed to the clarification of UNDP’s
role. EMAP and the old EDA (1) ceased operations, and the UNDP’s task was now to support
the new EDA. Progress appeared to have been fast judging from MACBP’s key milestones
(Annex 2), in spite of the fact the new General Manager of the EDA was appointed only in
October 2002. The initial project document of MACBP was fully funded (approximately
US$3 million), EDA staff was hired, equipment was ordered and put to use, some field
equipment was transferred from the MACC to the EDO, training was provided in various
areas, including MRE and Quality Assurance, LIS national staff was selected and hired in the
fall of 2002, and the LIS was launched (completed in June 2004), etc. Many achievements can
be cited, including the launching of five effective demining teams working to IMAS in the
central and western regions, effective support to victim assistance under the auspices of the
Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare, the launching of operations of six MRE teams under
auspices of UNICEF, support to the drafting and completion of a National Mine Action
Strategic Plan (2005-2009), etc. An evaluation of the MACBP was conducted in August
2004.52 The evaluation was supportive of MACBP, recommended broadening of Victim
Assistance, called for better integration with national planning, recommended broadening of
mine clearance resources (mechanical and dogs), and suggested that annual relief costs of
keeping IDPs in camps are 2-3 times higher than demining costs. Its final conclusions are:
“The appraisal team feels that the UNDP MACBP has achieved much in very little time, with
a paucity of resources, and that its role is crucial to the further growth and development of a
national mine action capacity in Eritrea. A final consideration is that Eritrea, as a signatory
to the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention, has put into place national policies and
frameworks to align itself to fulfil its obligations under article 6.3 and article 7 of the
Convention, but requires the resources to do so”.53
The arrival of the UNDP to help in the development of national mine action capacity was late,
i.e. about two years after the cessation of hostilities. In the mean time, the MACC was
engaged in providing support to EMAP, thus dividing a hectic period between supporting the
Force on the one hand, and supporting an emerging national mine action capacity on the other
hand. The efficiency with which the UNDP was able to launch a capacity development
programme, and the early successes of this work, were in no small measure due to the
capacity building efforts performed by the MACC and other mine action partners in previous
years. People had been trained and were absorbed in the two newly created entities
(EDA/EDO). Material and equipment were transferred from EMAP. Had it not been for the
early capacity building work by international mine action organizations including the MACC
51

See Annex 2 for a list of key milestones in the unfolding of the MACBP.
An Appraisal of the UNDP Mine Action Capacity Building Programme in Eritrea, by Dunne, Judith;
Lindbaek, Espen; Haile, Dr.Tesfay; Teodonno, Raffaele; August 13, 2004
53
Ibid, p.4
52
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that benefited EMAP, progress of UNDP’s MACBP would most likely have been more
modest.
At least two lessons can be formulated:
Capacity development support by a specialised agency should start immediately after
cessation of hostility and the arrival of a peacekeeping force, not two years later.
In countries with extensive contamination problems, mine action must have national
ownership to be successful and sustainable. This also infers that demining should be
included in national development plans as a pre-condition to achieve development goals.
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Chapter 5 – Mine Action Financing
5.1

UNMEE MACC Financial Resources

As of today, the UNMEE MACC has received a total of US$18.4 million from the Assessed
Contribution Budget, either on the basis of various UNOPS Memoranda of Understanding
(MOU), or through UNMEE administered funding.
In addition, the UNMEE MACC has been very successful in attracting contributions to the
Voluntary Trust Fund, totalling US$5.1 million. The following tables provide some details.
Table 1 – UNMEE MACC Mine Action Assessed Budget (US$000)
2000-01

2001-02

2002-03

2003-04

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1,187
1,200
0
0
0
0
2,387

1,386
1,200
90
0
0
214
2,890

1,468
1,200
100
0
0
221
2,989

1,468
1,431
100
3,256
1,581
603
8,439*

5,508
5,031
290
3,256
1,581
1,038
16,705

Mine detect. equipment
130
124
124
Mine detect. supplies
50
152
152
Mine detect. services
716
0
0
Sub-total UNMEE
896
276
276
Grand Total
896
2,663
3,166
Source: UNMEE MACC
* Partly offset by savings of some $5m by withdrawal of Slovaks

73
81
0
153
3,142

30
100
0
130
8,569

481
535
716
1,731
18,435

Activity

2004-05

Total

UNOPS MOU
MACC Staffing
Route Clearance Contract
Mine Awareness Contract
Integrated Demining Cont.
Clearance for Demarcation
UNOPS Mgt Fee
Sub-total UNOPS MOU
UNMEE Direct Funds

Table 2 – Summary of Donor Support to the Voluntary Trust Fund (US$)

Contributing Country

Amount

Japan
Germany
Netherlands
Canada
Norway
Italy
UK
Sweden
Denmark
Korea
Ireland
Un-earmarked
Total
Source: UNMAS finance section

1,063,385
672,806
550,000
441,846
325,172
241,756
851,518
188,489
126,197
55,000
52,496
892,500
5,461,165

It is clear from the above figures that the Programme Manager has been singularly successful
in attracting funds, sufficient to maintain current levels of activity. In Chapter 3, discussing
the mandate of UNMEE MACC, the Evaluation Team recommended an enhanced role for the
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MACC by tying its activities very closely to the basic objectives of the Force or Mission.
Such enhancement would entail mine action activities in direct support of communities to
gain the hearts and minds of the population, while deepening Force protection and mobility.
Should this recommendation be accepted, an additional need for funds could be envisaged
depending on the nature of the proposed enhancement, and on the weighing of a number of
related factors. These factors include, but are not limited to:
9 The serious mine contamination in the TSZ, requiring focused action of increasing
scope;
9 On the other hand, the fundamental change in the mandate of the UNMEE MACC
after the Proclamation 123 in mid-2002, significantly reducing the scope of its work,
notably by leaving mine action capacity building to the UNDP;
9 The possibility of obtaining additional funds (important here is the unique situation of
the integrated UNMEE MACC that allows access to both the Assessed Budget, and
the Voluntary Trust Fund);
9 The current stalemate with respect to final boundaries, a stalemate that has put further
work on demining for demarcation to a virtual stop, work that may need to be reactivated at a moment’s notice; and last but not least
9 Cooperation from EDA with respect to an enhanced mandate.54
It is recommended that UNMEE MACC prepare a costed proposal for the further
enhancement of its mine action activities that would accomplish the three-fold objective
of Force protection, Force mobility, and community support designed to gain the hearts
and minds of the population.55

5.2

MACBP Financial Resources

Although not a part of the evaluation’s Terms of Reference, it was nevertheless felt
appropriate to provide some comments on the financial resources required by the MACBP.
This would place into perspective the scope of required support for local capacity
development. It also tends to underscore previous comments to the effect that capacity
development is a task all unto its own, not to be confused, or mixed, with mine action in
support of Force requirements.
Cash flow requirements for the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2005-2009 run at US$1013 million a year for the next five years (see table below).
54

At the end of August 2004, an offer was extended to EDA by the MACC Programme Manager to
assist in mine clearance operations to allow the return of approximately 19,000 IDPs to several
villages in the Shilalo area. A request for assistance has subsequently been made by EDA.
55
Subsequent to the evaluation mission, UNMAS and UNOPS contracted commercial organisations to
provide mechanical and EDD assets in support of the Kenyan demining contingent, creating a
combined commercial-military capacity. This is termed the Integrated Demining Contract (IDC), and is
in line with our recommendation. More generally, we encourage UNMAS to update its analysis of the
capacities required to meet the Force Commander’s objectives on a periodic basis, and give active
consideration to alternative means for providing the requisite capacities in the most cost-effective
manner.
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Table 3 – National Mine Action Strategic Plan Cash Flow Requirements, (US$ m)

National Strategic Objective
Return of IDPs to 21 communities
Clearance 116 H & M impacted communities
MRE & risk reduction 344 low impacted communities
Victim assistance

Total

2005
4.2
3.5
0.5
2.1

2006
4.2
4.9
0.5
3.6

2007

2008

2009

9.7
0.6
2.9

10.5
0.6
2.0

11.2
0.5
1.8

10.3

13.2

13.2

13.1

13.5

Source: UNDP

During the period immediately following Proclamation 123 in mid-2002, and the expulsion of
mine action NGOs, the donor community was not greatly amused. Certain donors had
invested substantial amounts of money in Eritrean demining activities, especially the Dutch,
key sponsor of HALO Trust, and by far the largest contributor to Eritrea (see table in Annex 3
for donor contributions). Their sponsored activities came largely to a halt, and there was not
much inclination to invest in the country.
Yet, donors are coming back. They are encouraged by indications of MACBP success, based
on the findings of the August 2004 evaluation and discussions with the Chief Technical
Advisor. During the past three years the following contributions were made (see table below).
Table 4 – Contributions to (UNDP) MACBP 2002-2004 (US$ m)*

Donor

Contribution

European Union
1.604
Norway
3.000
Canada
0.728
Netherlands
0.500
United Kingdom
0.158
5.990
Total in US$ millions
Memoranda items – other contributions
Sweden
Technical advisors, vehicles and equipment
Switzerland
EOD explosive charges
US (State Department)
US demining company Ronco fully funded
*Not including in-kind contributions.
Note: Leahy Foundation pledged US$500,000 bilateral MLHW for income generation; Canada support
for CBR expansion under negotiation.
Source: UNDP

As the following table indicates, significant pledges have been made for the year 2005, but
much more is needed to accommodate future years.
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Table 5 – Programme Resources Pledged to (UNDP) MACBP (US$ m)*

Contributors

2005

Planned funding requirements
Govt. of Eritrea (wages)
Norway
US (Ronco)
EU (new)
EU (first balance LIS)
EU (second balance LIS)
South Korea
Italy
US (MRE)

2006

2007

2008

2009

10.30

13.20

13.20

13.10

13.50

0.70
1.46
2.80
0.72
0.33
0.07
0.05
0.10
0.23

0.70
1.46

0.70
1.46

0.80
1.46

0.80
1.46

0.48

2.26
2.26
6.46
2.64
2.16
Total Pledged
Remaining to be mobilized
3.84
10.56
11.04 10.84
11.24
*Not including in-kind technical advisors and equipment donations from SIDA and Switzerland
Source: UNDP

In comparing the figures from UNMEE MACC on the one hand and MACBP on the other
hand, one may make a hypothesis (to be confirmed by a more detailed cost-effectiveness
analysis, see Chapter 9) that the establishment of national mine action capacity leads to
significant advantages in terms of efficiency and effectiveness when compared to the costs
and performance of military demining contingents.
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Chapter 6 – Mine Action Staffing
6.1

Summary of Changes in Staffing Levels

6.1.1 FMAC
The integration of the Mine Awareness Cell (MACE) and the UNMO MRE cell into the
MACC and the formation of the Force Mine Action Centre (FMAC) enabled a joint
military/civilian structure to focus in a coordinated fashion on tasking and deployment of
assets. This integration resulted in the immediate reduction of seven UNMEE military staff
positions by amalgamation of responsibilities. Shortly after this new structure was created in
the fall of 2002, another two Force positions were “disestablished” (Chief MACE and a Mine
Awareness Warrant Officer) making it nine military positions that were eliminated.
The FMAC was fully established and integrated with civilian personnel in the MACC
compound in January 2003. FMAC consists of the following PKF military personnel: MRE
coordinator, MRE Officer, Kenyan Liaison Officer, Bangladeshi Liaison Officer, Clerk. In
addition there are three military secondments from UN Military Observers (UNMO): Mine
Action Liaison Officer (MALO) based in Addis Ababa, a Project Officer Demining for
Demarcation (PODD) based in Shilalo, and Field Mine Action Liaison Officer (FMALO) also
in Shilalo.
6.1.2 MACC
In the fall of 2002, two existing QA Officer positions in the MACC were amalgamated into
the Sector Regional Liaison Officers responsibilities, thus resulting in two MACC positions
being declared redundant. This meant that the UNMEE MACC international staff came down
from eleven positions before integration to nine after. Subsequently, a logistician was redeployed, making the current international core staff level of UNMEE MACC a total of ten.
In addition there are 40 local staff engaged by the UNMEE MACC.
UNOPS has signed Memoranda of Agreement with donors for the following in-kind
positions: two EOD Officers (Swiss Ministry of Defence); an IMSMA Officer (Swedish
Rescue Services Agency (SRSA)) shared with UNDP, and a Medical Coordinator (SRSA)
also shared with UNDP.
The ten core international positions are the following: Programme Manager, Chief of
Operations, Chief of Finance and Administration, Chief of Information, Operations Officer,
EOD Officer, Logistics Officer, two Regional Manager/QA Officers, and a Programme and
Training Officer.
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6.2

Staffing Issues

Are current UNMEE MACC staffing levels appropriate? This question should be answered in
terms of:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

the need for essential competencies to be available (even if not fully utilised);
the scope of responsibilities envisaged;
the current workload;
the degree of risk that can be accepted.

There is also the need to determine what options exist for engaging local personnel rather than
international staff, who cost many times more and whose benefit packages typically provide
for significant periods away from their duty stations.
Most mine action centres discharge a range of core functions, including:
•
•
•
•

operations planning and oversight
quality assurance
mine action information
finance and administration

There may be other distinct functions, such as MRE in the case of the UNMEE MACC, that a
MAC is required to perform. This range of functions, coupled with the limited number of
Eritreans with extensive training and experience in performing these functions within a mine
action programme intended to operate at international standards and the restrictions placed on
Eritreans vis-à-vis Ethiopian territory within the TSZ, suggest a core complement of
international staff of six, covering the following essential competencies – operations; QA;
information management; finance and administration; and MRE; plus the overall manager.
Additions to this complement of international staff need to be justified on other grounds.56
Turning next to the scope of responsibilities, one issue in many programmes is the geographic
scope of operations, particularly in areas with rudimentary transport systems. In this case,
UNMEE MACC has established two regional offices (West and Centre), each headed by an
international staff member. This seems reasonable provided operations actually are underway
or planned for the near future (e.g. to support the border demarcation work).
Another common issue relating to the scope of mine action operations relates to the range of
munitions in the theatre of operations. There is a large variety of explosive remnants of war in
the TSZ and adjacent areas, so provision for specialised EOD expertise appears reasonable.
Once provision is made for the essential capacities to cover core functions, and for the scope
of responsibilities, further additions to the international staffing complement must be justified
by (i) workload or (ii) degree of risk aversion. As noted earlier, militaries generally have
extremely low tolerances for risks to what are, or could become, mission critical functions.
56

There is always the possibility of recruiting multi-skilled individuals to cover two or more of these
essential competencies, but except for extremely small programmes this is generally not a satisfactory
option for extended periods.
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Therefore, military planners typically provide for significant redundancy in staffing,
equipment, and so on, which is a major reason why the military provision of humanitarian
assistance often costs many times more than civilian options. (OECD, 1998, Civilian and
Military Means…, op cit., p.32) Governments in many TCCs also exhibit extreme risk
aversion with respect to potential casualties among their troops serving on peacekeeping
missions. The evaluation team acknowledges there will be an understandable predisposition
toward low risk tolerance relating to UNMEE MACC affairs, and that this will affect staffing
decisions.
Turning now to workloads, a useful approach is to use other mine action programmes as
benchmarks for comparison. The table below provides some very basic indicators57 for three
mine action centres and programmes: (i) MACA in Afghanistan (a large and long established
national programme); (ii) the MACC SL in South Lebanon (a closer match to UNMEE
MACC, being fairly recent, connected to a peacekeeping operation, and responsible for a
range of commercial assets plus a small military component – the Lebanese Armed Forces);
and (iii) UNMEE MACC.
Table 6 – Staff/Deminers Ratios in Various Programmes
MA Centres
(1)
MACA
MACC SL
UNMEE
MACC

International
Staff
(2)
27
7
10

National
Staff
(3)
160
22
40

Number of
Deminers
(4)
6,500
400
201

Ratio
(4):(2)

Ratio
(4):(3)

240:1
57:1

41:1
18:1

20:1

5:1

The case of MACA in Afghanistan illustrates the importance of economies of scale. With one
central office in Kabul, and five regional offices throughout the country, the Afghanistan
Mine Action Centre (MACA) employs 27 international staff and 160 national staff.58 Of those
27 international staff, five are full time engaged in reconstruction work. Of the 160 local staff,
15 are full time working on reconstruction. For the 12 month period 2004-05, tasks include:
humanitarian mine action of 21.5 sq km, with 60% of funding covering mine action tasks and
40% support to priority projects under tight deadlines. In addition, the programme includes
battle area clearance of some 74 sq km, and surveys of some 30 km2. The total number of
deminers under the programme is approximately 6,500. Thus, the ratio of deminers to
international staff for the MACA in Afghanistan is 12 times higher than that for the MACC in
Eritrea, and the ratio of deminers to local MAC staff in Afghanistan is eight times that of
UNMEE MACC.
In contrast, the mine action programme managed by the Mine Action Coordination Cell in
South Lebanon (MACC SL) is significantly more modest, concentrating only on a region of a
much small country (and mainly on the border minefields and former occupied villages in
Southern Lebanon). MACC SL was responsible for demining funded by Operation Emirates
Solidarity, under which two commercial firms (BACTEC, which fielded about 280 personnel
57

Data on personnel numbers have been compiled from a variety of sources and, given the ebbs and
flows in mine action programmes, are intended to be indicative rather than definitive as per any
specific date. Those for Afghanistan relate to 2004; those for South Lebanon to 2003 when operations
were in full swing.
58
Source: United Nations mine action programme for Afghanistan, National Operational Work Plan
2004/05, UN, 2004. Also data from a recent mission to Afghanistan by Ted Paterson, GICHD
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along with dogs and a range of mechanical assets; and Mine Tech with over 100 personnel
plus dogs and one machine) were engaged to conduct demining operations and an
international NGO (MAG) was contracted to conduct surveys.59 In addition, 12 troops from
the Lebanon Armed Forces were assigned to work under MACC SL guidance and a series of
teams from the United Arab Emirates came for training in mine clearance and EOD. All told,
the ratio of deminers per MAC staff members (international, local, or combined) in Southern
Lebanon is about three times that for UNMEE MACC.
These big differences do not automatically demonstrate excess staffing of the UNMEE
MACC. Yet, the comparisons motivate one to seek ways to further reduce the staff
complement. Improvement in economies of scale will have to be sought in: (i) a possible
further re-structuring of combined FMAC and MACC positions (e.g. combining UNMO
demining for demarcation positions with MACC operational positions, or possibly phasing
out one MACC Regional Liaison Officer position); and (ii) enhancing the mandate of
UNMEE MACC as suggested in Chapter 3. With the arrival of four integrated demining
teams, such enhancement becomes a real option.
At the current level of activity, it seems clear that two other international positions fall very
much into the ‘nice to have’ rather than ‘need to have’ category. First, the Programme &
Training Officer position appears responsible largely for reporting.60 This task has been
discharged in a truly commendable fashion by the incumbent. However, the evaluation team
is far from certain that detailed reports of all activities on a weekly basis are required to meet
accountability and progress monitoring requirements. For these requirements, and recognising
the time pressures on those receiving such reports, monthly reporting on an ‘exceptions
basis’61 normally suffices. Detailed weekly reporting appears to serve more of a public
relations function. Such a public relations effort may be warranted, but then the position
should be justified on that basis rather than suggesting the weekly activity reports are required
for operational or oversight purposes.
Second, the UNMEE MACC organisation chart shows that the Operations Officer is
responsible mainly for the coordination of the two regional TAs. Due to the current situation,
with limited demining activities in the TSZ, it seems doubtful that this coordination role
justifies a full- time position. The coordination could be covered by the Chief of Operations.62
The evaluation team also notes that the option of training local personnel to assume roles
played by international staff (i.e. individual capacity development) could be explored more
aggressively by UNMAS for any programme that seems likely to endure for an extended
period. This can lead to significant cost reductions of staff and to important enhancements to
indigenous capacities within the overall mine action programme.
59

Another commercial firm – Armour Group – was engaged to provide QA under the guidance of the
UN QA Officer, and these international personnel are not reflected in the comparison.
60
According to an UNMEE MAC document (Lessons learned since 2000), the deployment of a
Programme Officer to the MACC in Asmara has enabled the UNMEE MACC to compile timely,
comprehensive, and useful reports to UNMEE and to UN headquarters in New York, allowing the
Programme Manager to focus on higher responsibilities such as policy and strategy.
61
This simply means that no detail is provided concerning activities which are going according to plan;
rather the focus is on ‘exceptions’ to the planned progress, with analysis of the causes for each
deviation and the steps underway or envisaged to address any problems.
62
Apparently, the Operations Officer stands in for the Chief of Operations during the latter’s absence.
This ‘filling-up’ role can be taken over by the EOD Training Officer, who should have appropriate
qualifications to serve at least temporarily as an Operations Officer.
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The big unknown in this whole matter is, of course, the resolution of the current border
stalemate and hence the termination of the UNMEE mission. In spite of that, a close second
look should be taken to further rationalise the staffing picture as much as possible (as was
done in early 2004), while planning for enhancement of operations that would satisfy not only
military requirements but also provide important development benefits to local communities.
It is recommended to re-examine UNMEE MACC staffing options, including further
staffing amalgamation options, and define a mine action programme that would enhance
current activities by ensuring: (i) the satisfaction of military requirements; and (ii) the
satisfaction of community aspirations in line with Force objectives.
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Chapter 7 – Information Technology
The UNMEE MACC has a Security Council mandate to facilitate mine action particularly
"through exchanging and providing existing maps and any other relevant information to the
United Nations" (Resolution 1344 [2001]). The establishment of an Information Section
within the MACC as the central repository of all mine-related data in Eritrea, as well as the
implementation and maintenance of a mine action database for Eritrea, fulfils this particular
requirement. The Information Section is absolutely central to planning and implementing all
mine action operations in Eritrea

7.1 Basic Structure and Activities of the UNMEE MACC Information
Section
The Section consists of two international (one core staff and one in-kind staff) and five
national staff members, and is housed in three offices in the MACC headquarters. One may
identify seven distinct components of activity as follows:
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

IMSMA database, functioning as the national database in Eritrea.
GIS for mapping and to support IMSMA
"Add-on" data bases as a complement to IMSMA (for information where
IMSMA is lacking, or to enhance existing features)
Support to the Field Administration Support System (FASS)
Other office support databases, such as "Expendables" (warehouse supply
program for IT consumables, or "correspondence".
IT with network administration and network support, hardware and software
installations, training,
IT office support.

Of these components, IMSMA and GIS stand out. If these two systems are used and
controlled properly, they can be fundamental and indispensable to all decision making related
to mine action.
The Section's main activity is the maintenance of all databases with a well-defined QA/QC
scheme for all data. In addition, the Section is producing some 50-200 maps per month, a vast
number of statistics and tables and provides support to the Operations Section for tasking
MACC and UNMEE, as well as supporting external clients with maps (e.g. development
agencies, NGOs, etc.)
EDA has established an information section similar to the MACC. EDA is now capable of
running IMSMA and GIS with most – if not all – data coming from the MACC systems. The
main challenge here is to find, and appoint, a qualified local IT specialist to assure
sustainability (see also Chapter 4). Currently work is in progress to establish an automatic
procedure to synchronize the IMSMA databases and to have one updated national IMSMA
database running simultaneously in both institutions. A distributed data entry (DDE) facility
for this purpose is delivered with the system and has been in use with little or no problem for
over two years in Lebanon, Chile, and in Afghanistan. The extensive local changes being
performed are designed to allow the system to perform this function while providing EDA
with access to just those data elements associated with its own territory.
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GeoCell is the cartographic unit of UNMEE. It has a mapping capability similar to that of the
MACC Information Section. There is an agreement between the two that standard topographic
map production at the scales of 1:50,000 and 1:100,000 will be provided by GeoCell, while
all mine-related maps and specific thematic maps will be printed by MACC. Both
organizations have an agreement to share regularly updated mapping information to ensure
standardisation.

7.2 IMSMA
The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) is a software-based data
management tool for use at mine action centres. It includes a geographic information system
(GIS) and can provide, if all goes well, up-to-date information to managers allowing them to
plan, manage, report, and map demining related activities.
It can be said that IMSMA is in the formative stage. It has experienced difficulties in the past,
and UNMEE MACC has not been spared in this respect. In fact, a redesign of the system is
being planned with the intention of ironing out problems that have been experienced. The redesign has been underway since August with planning and tendering processes started in
2003.
Looking at the IMSMA system as implemented in UNMEE MACC, the following positive
observations can be made:
o IMSMA has proven to be a most powerful tool in Eritrean mine action: it is
fundamental to planning and tasking. UNMEE-MACC has greatly benefited from this
tool, as have local authorities such as the EDA and EDO as well as other
organizations.
o The position of the Information Section within the UNMEE/MACC organisational
structure is most appropriate. The section functions in a staff (advisory) position,
supporting a number of users both within UNMEE/MACC and outside. Data entry is
controlled by the Section for quality assurance, an essential condition of independence
if the system is to maintain relevance and accuracy. Losing control over data entry
(which might occur if the section were placed in a line position with data entry by
various functional units) could seriously affect quality of output.63
o A number of technical problems related to installation that have plagued the system
have been resolved satisfactorily: (i) distortion of polygons; (ii) problems of reinstalling IMSMA software; (iii) restoring the IMSMA database.

63

Some people would argue in favour of allowing UNMEE MACC Operations to input data directly for
enhanced operational control. This argument has merit, but could give rise to mistakes when different
individuals with different functions input a multitude of different mine action statistics into a system that
is notoriously complicated and very much in need of simplification. While, on balance in the opinion of
the evaluation team, the situation in Eritrea calls for a separation between the Information Section and
Operations because important mapping services are provided to external clients, this does not exclude
the need for close cooperation between the two, given that Operations is the principal client.
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Many problems have been corrected by updates to the system fielded in 2003 and others in
early 2004. A number of technical challenges remain for IMSMA. They can generally be
categorised as the growing pains of the system:
o Problems not related to installation continue to exist: (i) the coordinates of the starting
points of mined areas are (occasionally) recalculated by IMSMA in the wrong way;
(ii) the export function works erratically (being corrected at the time of writing this
report); (iii) there is, in the opinion of the Head of Information Technology, not
sufficient consideration for quality control.64
o A number of problems have been resolved through ‘add-ons’, intended to create
functions desired by UNMEE. It is expected that these ‘add-ons’ will be removed as
soon as the respective problems in the IMSMA system have been resolved. These
‘add-ons’ are: (i) Progress databases (to overcome a perceived insufficiency of the
progress reporting facility); (ii) Tasking database; (iii) Accident statistics; (iv) MRE
statistics; and (v) LIS memo database. (See Box on following page for more detail.)65
o Of particular importance in a peacekeeping mission is the ability of the system to
identify cleared roads. IMSMA does not support ‘line features’ only ‘fields’. The
system suffers, therefore, from a serious handicap in maintaining a database required
by peacekeeping forces whose effectiveness is based on mobility. As long as this
problem remains, an ‘add-on’ will be fully justified.66
o The display of information in IMSMA-GIS is very rudimentary (e.g. the interface that
allows more detailed information of a minefield by clicking on the respective point on
a map).67
In addition to the above technical challenges, an important operational improvement could
be envisaged for IMSMA:
o In order to facilitate access to the database by non-technical people, it would be useful
to try to simplify the system significantly. Generally speaking, the simpler the system
the more useful it becomes to others than only the hi-tech wizards.
Preparation for hand-over of the system to local authorities:
o In the long run, the IMSMA competence developed in UNMEE MACC will need to
be transferred to the local EDA. At the moment the EDA and MACC exchange data
once a week (as far as possible), and the latter then enters it into the system. Strategies
will have to be devised by UNDP MACBP with MACC assistance and advice, to
transfer the IMSMA competence to local authorities in order to be prepared for an
eventual withdrawal of peacekeeping forces and the consequent de-mobilization of the
UNMEE MACC.
64

GICHD asserts that there are a number of facilities that address various aspects of quality control
with respect to the content of the data base.
65
Subsequent to writing this evaluation report, significant improvements have been introduced into the
system allowing the removal of at least two ‘add-ons’, i.e. MRE and accident statistics.
66
The system re-design includes a function specifically designed for this purpose
67
GICHD asserts, in this respect, that local customization of the map displays is possible within the
functionality provided by the ESRI GIS product ArcView 3.2.a or 3.3
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While it is clear that IMSMA has provided a powerful means of data entry and retrieval, it is
still a work in progress that requires improvement. The recent upgrading of the system
(introduced after the present evaluation took place) has removed some important irritants.
Recommendations emerging from the above description are self-evident, but will be
formulated here as a concluding summary.
In spite of important recent upgrades that now allow the system to operate relatively
smoothly, work still needs to be done to resolve remaining technical problems, with
particular emphasis on removing remaining ‘add-ons’, and facilitating ease of access by
significantly simplifying the system. The installation of the latest version of IMSMA into
the MACC system in December 2004 has obviated the need for many add-ons and has
greatly enhanced the functionality of IMSMA for the MACC.
Additional efforts will have to be made for handover of IMSMA expertise to the national
authorities (EDA), an effort that requires full EDA participation (especially the
recruitment and training of a competent IT specialist) and continued close cooperation
between UNMEE MACC and UNDP MACBP.
Textbox 4 – IMSMA “Add-Ons” with their functionalities
(1) Progress Database
- Easy entry, storage and retrieval of regular (weekly/monthly) demining activities
(‘progress’) in terms of area (m2), road length (km) and cleared devices, grouped by
company, defined for any selected time period.
- Additionally, log monitoring system of demining activities to report, if a company did not
work in a certain period.
- Main target user is the Ops Section (developed to support Ops at follow-up of tasks).
(2) Tasking Database
- Easy entry, storage and listing of tasks, with interface to IMSMA.
- Tasks can be printed in Gantt charts in different formats showing the completion rate, or
listed with key data.
- Locations are displayed in the ‘add-on’. Also transferable to GIS.
- In addition, UXO, which have been reported and/or destroyed by EOD teams, are
entered in a user-friendly way to generate tasking as well as completion report.
- Main target user is the Ops Section (developed to support Ops at tasking)
(3) Accident Statistics*
- Data entry and retrieval module of data about accidents and victims in high compatibility
with IMSMA. Data structure is compliant to IMSMA; user interface is very similar to
IMSMA. Reports are designed to meet the needs of MACC Eritrea. Interface to GIS.
- The particular data feature of mine accidents on roads has been added.
(4) MRE Statistics*
- Works as a report generator, i.e. the interface enables a user-friendly retrieval of MRE
beneficiaries by selected period, with a breakdown by age, gender, and organization.
(5) LIS Memo Database
- IMSMA LIS tables do not allow storage of memo fields (long text). LIS was collecting
long text data (comments, descriptions, survey problems, etc) in the field, which had to
be entered to a database system.
- The system is look-alike and feels similar to IMSMA.
* Note: these two ‘add-ons’ have become redundant after a recent upgrade of the system took
place some time after the evaluation occurred.
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7.3 – Mapping
The establishment of the MACC’s mapping facility has gone through a long and careful
process. Based on old Russian maps (which proved to be off by some 1.6 km), GPS was
applied correcting locations to some 5-20 meters accuracy and validating the locations of
roads. With the introduction of LIS information, community locations were identified. The
University of Bern created an entire new map set for Eritrea as part of the LIS project (at a
cost of more than $200,000).
The Information Section of UNMEE-MACC has succeeded in establishing a state of the art
map production facility. The quality of maps being produced serve as a standard for the whole
country. This is a great achievement!
The marriage of IMSMA and maps works very well indeed. The maps are being used by the
Government authorities and the international community with equal enthusiasm. Maps can be
produced on very short notice and are freely available upon request (on average, some 50-200
maps are produced a month).
The ability to produce maps has now been introduced to EDA. The latter is now able to
produce maps itself. This has contributed significantly to local mine action capacity
development.
The ability to produce state of the art maps, and the introduction of IMSMA data allowing for
numerous permutations and combinations in map information, has proven fundamental in
guiding mine action operations, including prioritisation and tasking.
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Chapter 8 – Integration of Military Demining Assets
8.1 Peacekeeping Military versus Civilian Role in Mine Action
Wherever there is a mine and UXO problem, mine action initiatives require a high degree of
cooperation between military personnel, civilian mine action staff and local authorities.
Although initially intended for force protection and to ensure mobility, military demining
capabilities, if properly directed and controlled, can bring important skills and organisational
assets to complement activities more focused on community based mine action. Military
organisations are normally trained to be mission orientated, and to complete these missions as
quickly as possible. This works well for almost all military challenges, and indeed for many
humanitarian problems like infrastructure repair. A study carried out by the Geneva
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining concluded: “Military forces, both local and
visiting, have made a significant contribution to mine action.”68
At the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between tasks of a short-term nature and those
institutional development activities requiring a long-term approach. Establishing national
mine action programmes under post-conflict conditions requires long-term commitment that
may continue long after the mission has completed its tasks. Right after a conflict, it is of
great importance to gain an overview and a clear picture of the level of pollution in terms of
landmines and UXO, and to use the data for priority setting and tasking of the demining
assets. Development programmes are very much linked to demining efforts as they can only
progress well in a safe environment. Therefore, a database on landmines and UXO
contamination has to be set up and maintained properly from the beginning aiming to support
long-term efforts. This requires technically qualified staff with long-term presence in the
country. It calls for a civilian-run coordination body, as the military is not trained to deal with
long-term mine action issues and related socio-economic aspects.

8.2

Joint Assessment Mission

Though small-scale humanitarian demining was carried out before UNMEE started its
mission, no comprehensive information was available to assess the scope of the landmine
problem in Eritrea and especially in the TSZ.
The HALO Trust conducted a so-called rapid survey right after the border conflict in 2000. It
was focused for the most part on the former confrontation lines, but did not cover roads within
today’s TSZ. As in most post conflict scenarios, there was a high likelihood of roads being
mined by the conflict parties. The results of the HALO survey, therefore, gave only a rough
idea of the pollution and certainly were not accurate enough to allow for a reliable assessment
of the mine situation in the area of concern.
The Security Council authorized the deployment of 4,200 troops to monitor the 1000 km long
and 25 km wide TSZ along the provisional border which is known to be contaminated with
landmines and UXO. Both Force protection as well as Force mobility became key concerns.
68

Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, The Role of the Military in Mine Action,
June 2003, page13
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Suitable assets had to be selected and deployed to ensure safety for all UN staff, both on the
roads and in fields used by the mission (e.g. compounds and areas around watch towers)
Demining of key areas to support demarcation was not part of the mandate at that time.
As safety of all UN staff is of utmost importance, the assets to be used and the demining
procedures to be applied have to meet high quality standards.
Assessment missions are of great significance as the mission approaches. Wrong or imprecise
assessments may lead to wrong decisions and may affect the mission’s future operations,
including efficiency and effectiveness factors.
The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) carried out in July 2000 proposed the deployment of
road clearance assets and demining machines capable of preparing the ground for manual
deminers and mine detection dogs if needed. Based on an agreement between the UN and the
Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) the following mine clearance assets were deployed in
early 2001.69
Table 7 – Mine clearance Assets Deployed in Early 2001
TCC
Kenya
Bangladesh

Slovakia

Number of staff
(all ranks)
90
72

130

Mechanical equipment

1 Aardvark medium flail

Other key assets
2 teams (45 deminers each), 40
mine detectors
2 teams (36 deminers each), 4
MDDs per team, 36 mine
detectors,

9 Bozena mini flails, 3 flail
systems UOS 155 Belarty, 4 T55
roller systems

As the technical discussion below explains in more detail, some serious flaws were made in
determining requirements. The mechanical assets deployed by the Slovaks, with the exception
of one of the nine Bozenas,70 were not suitable to the country conditions even though they
may have looked good on paper. A closer examination of geographic and weather conditions
(poor road conditions, isolation in the rainy season complicating repairs, overheating of
equipment in hot areas resulting in equipment breakdown) would have pointed to a selection
of more appropriate mechanical assets. In addition to the inappropriateness of some of the
mechanical assets, one may question the large number of such assets deployed (in total 13
flail systems), especially since there was no clarity in the first Security Council Resolution
concerning a humanitarian mine action mandate beyond relevant coordination and provision
of technical advice (see chapter 3).
Another serious problem of inefficiency resulted from the lack of integration of the TCC
combined assets. A fully integrated set of assets, combining mechanical, manual, and dogs
has strong potential to raise cost-effectiveness of demining. During the course of the mission,
the advantages of integrated teams have been realized, and four such teams are currently
being deployed.
69

UNMEE MACC, Restructuring of the Demining Assets within UNMEE, page 4
The Slovaks deployed eight Bozenas ‘2’ and one (more effective) Bozena ‘4’. Under a new and
supplementary contract contract, Mechem operates four Bozenas ‘4’.
70
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Experienced inefficiencies of TCC demining assets resulted from other factors. Of importance
are the observed insufficiencies in maintaining appropriate mine action standards. As will be
discussed below, the Bangladeshi demining contingent worked far below IMAS, thus
presenting not only a danger to themselves but also raising questions about the safety of socalled “cleared” areas. Furthermore, there is a problem of accountability: demining
contingents are accountable to their own national governments; any requests by UNMEE
MACC to improve performance (e.g. the Slovaks reportedly worked one and a half hour per
day on average, managing to clear a mere 200 meters of road a day on average) would be of
no avail.
In the course of the last few years, it has also become clear that deployment of commercial
demining assets as a supplement to TC assets provides much synergy to the overall mix of the
demining effort. The work of the first commercial company (UXB), contracted for road
clearance, was terminated because of a new requirement being identified for rapid route
clearance. Its successor (Mechem) has proven itself to be a highly efficient outfit. In addition,
there are very significant cost savings by using commercial assets as opposed to TCC assets
(see Chapter 9) and the commercial company is much more controllable.
A number of recommendations emerge from the above:
A Joint Assessment Mission should include a highly experienced mine action specialist
thoroughly familiar with force demining requirements as well as demining in
accordance with IMAS. The specialist should also have a sound knowledge of all
demining technologies available and their appropriate application. DPKO may have to
fall back on external expertise to cover the whole range of aspects.
The need for a judicious mix of demining assets will need to be anticipated right at the
start of the mission, based on
(i)

a clear definition of tasks expected to be performed, combined with a liberal
rather than a narrow interpretation of the Security Council Resolution
defining the mandate;

(ii)

the realization that there is a considerable dual benefit of demining
accruing to both the military and the affected communities; and

(iii) the significant scope that exists to supplement and/or complement
traditional contingent demining assets with commercial demining assets.
DPKO needs to institutionalise the authority and competence to negotiate with TCC in
order to ensure the best contribution suited to circumstances. UNMAS could play an
important role in this respect.
The determination of the right assets during the Joint Assessment Mission also has important
implications for the source of funding. It allows for a more considered inclusion of
anticipated expenditures into the Assessed Budget, rather than having to rely on subsequent
contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund. This suggests the following recommendation:
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The Assessed Budget should include a well-considered mix of expenditures that takes
into account the natural unfolding of demining activities that normally change
significantly when the mission moves from an emergency state to a state of stability.

8.3

Assessment of Assets Deployed to Eritrea

8.3.1 Mechanical equipment
The military road clearance equipment deployed to Eritrea by the TCCs was not suitable to
meet safety and clearance requirements. Military demining equipment, especially when it is
exclusively designed to breach minefields in a combat situation, is not reliable enough to clear
areas to a level that is demanded by International Mine Action Standards.
(i) Roller systems
Roller systems attached to main battle tanks, such as the KMT system, are designed to breach
paths into minefields in combat situations, but not to clear roads to a standard demanded by
IMAS. The disc array in front of the tank covers only a small area of the road to be treated.
Therefore, several runs are necessary to cover the whole road and the roadside, if considered
necessary. A required overlap to ensure a full coverage of the ground in a specified area is
hard to achieve, especially on curves in the road. Additionally, roller systems are proven to be
unreliable on uneven ground as areas may not be treated by the disc and therefore mines do
not detonate as intended. From January 2002 to October 2002 the Slovaks treated only 317
km of roads with their roller systems. Compared to that the civilian contractor MECHEM
cleared 1,662 kilometres of road within 9 months in 200471.
Road clearance is known to be technically difficult and time consuming, no matter what sort
of mines are likely to be encountered. Both, the humanitarian demining community and the
military still have to rely on either the use of MDD or on vehicle mounted metal detection
systems. Other technologies such as ground penetrating radar are still premature to be fielded.
Even most of the NATO forces, which are reputedly better equipped than many armies from
developing countries have currently no sufficient answer to respond to this particular
challenge.
During the last decade mine action has developed quickly. A great many studies have been
carried out leading to enhanced productivity, highest safety standards and consideration of
socio-economic aspects. The UNMEE MACC as the coordination body has to be given the
mandate to use equipment that has the technical potential to ensure the highest possible level
of clearance, as otherwise safety of UN staff (and civilians for that matter) cannot be
guaranteed.

71

UNMEE MACC, Demining Progress Statistics, 01 January 2004 – 31 October 2004, 01 January
2002 – 31 December 2002
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Figure 1 – T 55 tank roller operating in Eritrea

The decision made by the MACC in late 2002 to contract a commercial company for road
clearance was the right one as the military assets did not have the technical potential to ensure
a high level of safety and clearance performance. The increase of productivity, and
consequently of safety for mission staff, can be deduced from the graph shown on the
following page.
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Graph 1 – Clearance performance of commercial and military demining units
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(iii) Heavy flail systems
Heavy flail systems, such as the Belarty (see picture below) that are based on a battle tank
chassis, have never been tested impartially and independently as they are not commonly used
for humanitarian mine clearance purposes. Therefore, the clearance performance of such
systems has not been properly evaluated. However, experience shows that the running costs of
heavy machinery such as battle tanks (fuel, oil, lubricants) are extremely high and their
technical complexity often causes downtime, which makes them unsuitable for large scale
demining operations. Poor road conditions in developing countries make transportability of a
30 tonne machine difficult; sometimes even impossible.
Therefore their suitability for operations in developing countries is considered to be very
limited. Many kinds of flail systems are not applicable to road clearance as their working
tools destroy the surface of dirt roads. Their main purpose is to prepare the ground aiming to
support manual deminers or mine detection dogs (MDD). Clearance statistics provided by the
MACC do not show the actual use of this particular machine type, as they exclusively display
the m2 cleared by the Slovakian contingent as a whole.

Figure 2 – UOS 155 Belarty

(iv) Bozena mini flail
The system has been independently and impartially tested by the Croatian Mine Action Centre
(CROMAC) in January 2002 and basically is proven to be a valuable asset for ground
preparation to assist operations carried out by manual deminers and mine detection dogs
(MDD). The Bozena is not a stand-alone mine clearance asset, which means that the area
treated by the machine has to be searched either by dogs or manual deminers.
According to the CROMAC test report, the Bozena has an average productivity of 300 to 500
m2 per hour, depending on soil conditions, type of vegetation encountered, and level of mine
contamination.72 Low running costs and ease of logistic support and transport (5,500 kg)
make the system suitable in many situations.

72

Republic of Croatia, Croatian Mine Action Centre, Testing of Bozena 3 Mine Clearance Machine,
January 2002, page 33
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However, dry and hard soil conditions may cause technical problems to the machine and
require modifications; especially with regard to the cooling system. The particular
environment encountered in the operational area has to be assessed properly prior the
deployment of equipment in order to avoid excessive downtime.
The soil conditions in the areas visited by the evaluation team (Shilalo-Sector West) allow the
use of the Bozena for ground preparation. The suitability of the machine for clearing the pillar
sites in other areas cannot be evaluated as there may be other soil conditions to be
encountered.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) agreed with the Slovakian Government
on the deployment of nine Bozena mini flails to Eritrea. Their theoretical daily output (5
working hours/400m2 per hour per machine) is 18,000m2. Assuming the machines were
operational five days a week and 50 weeks per year, roughly 4,500,000m2 could have been
treated. However, according to UNMEE MACC progress statistics for 2003, the Slovakian
contingent treated only 687,918 m2 of ground. This figure possibly includes an unknown area
treated by the 3 Belarty systems. The figures show that the machines were extensively underutilized, at high opportunity costs. The decision made in 2000 to deploy 12 flail systems does
not seem reasonable considering the vast degree of under-utilisation.
The UNMEE MACC is going to start a demining project called “integrated demining” in
early 2005. After the withdrawal of the Slovakian contingent, there are no ground preparation
systems left in Eritrea. UNMEE MACC, therefore, decided to contract MECHEM for ground
preparation using four Bozena mini flails and to combine these systems with manual deminers
and, optionally, with mine detection dogs. This approach seems to be reasonable and the local
population will benefit highly from the expected increase of productivity.

Figure 3 – Remotely controlled Bozena mini flail

(v) Aardvark flail system
The Aardvark is a mechanical mine clearance system mainly in service with the military. It is
proven to be a valuable asset when used in the right environment and under appropriate
circumstances.73 However, the mass of the vehicle (roughly 15 tonnes) requires a low-bed
trailer for transportation and an appropriate road infrastructure, which can be found only in a
few areas of Eritrea. This has to be taken into account prior to deployment. MACC staff
73

United States Army, Communications- Electronic Command Research, Development and
Engineering Centre, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Capabilities Demonstration Test Report, January 2002
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pointed out that the Bangladeshi contingent had no appropriate transport vehicle to ensure the
deployment of their demining machine to the demining sites as required. In 2003 the
Aardvark was only operational for seven hours in total and treated not more than 2,400 m2,74
an area that can normally be done by a comparable machine in one day.

Figure 4 – Ardvark on a low bed trailer.

The mass of this vehicle leads to difficult transport on dirt roads.
All demining organisations, whether military or civilian, acting under UN umbrella in a
defined area of responsibility must follow mine action standards that are derived from IMAS.
The equipment applied must have the technical potential to achieve full clearance.
Unfortunately, many military forces are not equipped to carry out large-scale road clearance
operations leading to results that come up to IMAS.
The following recommendations are offered:
Military demining assets offered by TCCs have to be assessed accurately prior their
deployment with the prospect of their potential utilisation, clearance performance,
suitability for the particular environment, and cost-effectiveness.
DPKO should arrange for a review of the use of the assets deployed to a mission after
one year aiming to do adjustments, if necessary.
The use of commercial assets should be considered an option from the beginning of a
mission, if the security situation allows.
8.3.2 Demining equipment and procedures of military demining units
Demining aims to identify and remove or destroy all mine and UXO hazards from a specified
area to a specified depth. For buried landmines and UXO this depth should normally not be
less than 13 centimetres below the original surface level.75 The figure is based on the effective
74
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United Nations, Office of Internal Oversight Services, Internal Audit Division-1, 29 September 2004
International Mine Action Standards. Series 9
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detection depth of the majority of modern metal detectors. This means that the equipment
used by both civilian and military demining teams has to ensure a performance, which meets
this internationally, agreed standard.
The beneficiaries of demining operations, regardless whether they are mission staff or local
population, must be confident that cleared land is safe for their use. Equipment and
operational procedures applied by the demining units – both military and civilian – have to
meet this requirement.
The evaluation team visited demining operations carried out by the Kenyan and Bangladeshi
contingents in Shilalo, Sector West. Both units conducted tasks given by the MACC through
the FMAC and seemed to be highly motivated. However, there was a significant gap between
the two contingents with regards to working procedures, equipment and understanding of
safety requirements.
The Kenyan demining units were trained by British experts in Nairobi prior to their
deployment. They apply working procedures that are in line with IMAS (for instance
appropriate safety distances between deminers and set up of the demining site). Their personal
protective equipment is “state of the art” and meets all safety requirements for the demining
staff. MACC staff stressed that deminers encounter highly mineralised soil in the Shilalo area
that seriously affects metal detectors. Therefore the metal detectors used have to be of high
quality. Only modern models have been proved to have the feature to compensate for soil
conditions with minimal loss of target sensitivity. The Minelab model used by the Kenyans
has been tested independently and impartially by various organisations and performed
generally well. It can be concluded that the Kenyan deminers achieve clearance standards
demanded by IMAS and their working procedures in conjunction with their protective
equipment ensure a high level of safety for the staff. Their relative productivity under the
prevailing conditions cannot be judged as there are no other operating units using manual
methods only.
By contrast, the Bangladeshi deminers apply purely military methods that do not correspond
to the latest knowledge on safe and effective demining.

Pick used
for
excavation

Figure 5 – Bangladeshi deminers conducting “road clearance” in the Shilalo area

The clearance methods applied should guarantee a high level of safety for the deminers. The
use of picks for excavation, the small safety distances between the deminers and the poor
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personal protective equipment (flak jackets, skiing goggles) are only three examples showing
deficiencies with respect to internationally agreed safety standards.
As displayed on the picture above, the Bangladeshi contingent does not use base sticks or
markings to ensure that the whole area searched is covered entirely as demanded. The
performance and the suitability of their metal detectors is at least questionable as it is an old
model (METEX 4122/4125, produced by Institute Dr. Foerster – Germany) which has no
“ground compensation” system to compensate for highly mineralised soil and would therefore
have difficulties to perform well under the conditions encountered in the Shilalo area.
The MACC operations branch has been aware that the performance of the Bangladeshi
deminers is not appropriate to meet necessary requirements. “As we have till now not had the
confidence in the clearance we have only allowed the Bangladeshi to demine low risk road
tasks where the likelihood of mines is low and the verges of roads where only high metal
content AT mines have been found. We do not record the roads cleared by the Bangladeshi as
cleared until the route clearance contractor has also cleared them”.76
In this context UNMEE MACC commented in 2003 on the dangers of “…demining in purely
military methods, leaving behind questions of cleared land as a result of poor marking and
demining processes”77. The paper was disseminated to DPKO, UNMAS and the UNMEE
force in 2003 apparently without leading to any changes.
The International Mine Action Standards are issued by the United Nations to guide planning,
implementation and management of mine action programmes. The work of preparing,
reviewing and revising these standards has been conducted by technical committees with the
support of international organizations, governmental bodies and NGOs. They have been
developed to improve safety and efficiency in mine action, and to guarantee the full clearance
of potentially affected land. The IMAS cover a wide range of issues from the accreditation of
mine detection dogs (MDD) to medical support for demining staff, from safety and
occupational health to survey, from sampling of cleared land to storage and transport of
explosives. They are well accepted by the international demining community and serve as the
common ground, as they are based on relevant experiences gained from all over the world and
latest research results. The UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping has specifically
recommended that troop-contributing countries follow national and international standards for
mine action, including IMAS.78
The Bangladeshi contingent started demining operations in 2001 and according to UNMEE
MACC they have cleared manually 1,726,868 m2 of land so far.79 This does not include 1,146
kilometres of road treated by them since 2001. Due to the inadequate methods used during the
last four years, the status of the area cleared is questionable and the gain for either the local
population or the Force is debatable at best.
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David Bax, chief of operations UNMEE MACC, e-mail to Johannes Dirscherl, 19 November 2004
UNMEE MACC, Restructuring of Demining Assets within UNMEE, page 5
78
See the section on mine action in the fifty-seventh session of the C34 Comprehensive Review of
Peacekeeping, paras. 145-149.
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Demining Progress Statistics January 2001-October 2004
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If it is the Force policy to win the hearts and minds of the local population,80 the use of
military demining assets can be a valuable contribution to this end. However, an accident in
an area previously cleared by UNMEE deminers would certainly be counterproductive and
has to be avoided.
The issue was raised by the evaluation team during a discussion with the Force Commander.
It resulted in a decision to train the Bangladeshi contingent and introduce higher standards to
their operation. The evaluation team is not aware of any reason as to why such a decision was
not made when these marginal standards became known shortly after the deployment of the
Bangladeshi contingent. Even if the MACC and the Force Commander did not have the
mandate to influence the operating procedures of demining contingents, the potentially
serious impact on the Mission should have raised alarm.
All demining organisations, no matter whether they are military, commercial or civilian,
acting under a UN umbrella in a defined area of responsibility must follow mine action
standards that are derived from IMAS. The equipment applied must have the technical
potential to achieve full clearance.
The UNMEE MACC may have to consider clearing the Bangladeshi areas again using a
commercial company to ensure full safety, or at least to carry out a comprehensive threat
assessment in order to decide on further action.
The following recommendations emerge:
Demining staff intended to be used in the UN area of responsibility must be trained,
prior to deployment, to apply international mine action standards.
UNMAS may wish to consider quality assuring existing regional mine action training
centres for future training purposes of TCC contingents.
Donors should be requested to contribute equipment and training to improve the
standard of demining assets.

80

Force Commander Major General Singh, interview with the evaluation team, …
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Progress Statistics - Area Cleared TSZ
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Chapter 9 – Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
9.1

Comparison of Military and Civilian Demining Units

The TORs list the following as one of the three goals of the evaluation:
Provide a cost benefit analysis of peacekeeping demining versus commercial
demining in support of a security council mandate.
The GICHD proposal incorporated the following to elaborate our understanding of
what was required and feasible:
A comparative cost-benefit or, more likely, cost-effectiveness analysis of demining in
support of a Security Council mandate performed by (i) peacekeeping forces and (ii)
commercial firms, together with a comparative assessment of the two types of
demining service providers in terms of other relevant performance criteria (access,
flexibility, safety, timeliness of availability, capacity to deliver integrated mine action
services, etc.).
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis is part of the broader family of analytic techniques
termed Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), which are used to compare inputs into a
production system (such as a demining service) relative to the goods and services
produced by that system. The goods and services produced can be assessed at the
point of immediate outputs (for demining, areas surveyed or cleared, lengths of road
surveyed or cleared, devices destroyed, etc.) or outcomes – how the people receiving
the outputs actually make use of them (e.g. planting crops on the areas cleared,
travelling on the roads cleared, etc.) for their benefit.
Full CBA can be done when four conditions are met:
i. a reasonably complete and accurate set of data on the quantities of resource
inputs,
ii. a reasonable basis for determining the financial costs of those inputs,
iii. a reasonably complete and accurate set of data on the quantity of outputs (and,
if possible, outcomes), and
iv. a reasonable basis for determining the financial value of the outputs/outcomes.
While problems may arise in obtaining or determining any of these data, satisfying the
third and fourth conditions is generally challenging. In meeting the third condition
(quantities of outputs), we need to ensure we are comparing similar outputs. There are
three common problems, all of which arise frequently in the field of demining:
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Table 8 – Common Problems in Comparing Productivity Figures
Problem
Apples versus Oranges
(comparing dissimilar things)
Apples versus rotten apples
(dissimilar quality of
clearance)
Apples versus mixed fruit
(dissimilar numbers of
benefits)

Examples of errors
Comparing suspected hazards rendered safe by (i)
combined survey and clearance versus (ii) full clearance.
Comparing areas cleared to high (or humanitarian)
standards versus areas cleared to a level of “acceptable”
risk (e.g. breaching)
Comparing single capacity units (e.g. demining) versus
multiple capacity units (e.g. demining and peacekeeping)

Meeting the fourth condition (value of outputs) is particularly challenging when the
outputs lead in turn to benefits which are intangible (such as an enhanced sense of
security for civilians or for peacekeeping troops) or which are not comfortably
expressed in financial terms (such as the value of lives and limbs saved). Thus, for
demining, one may be able to determine values for cleared land, buildings, roads, etc.
based on the market value or the value of future production made possible by the
clearance, but some of the benefits – security; lives and limbs saved – are not easily
reduced to financial terms. In some mine action situations, it is precisely these
intangible or non-financial benefits that are the most important.
When only the final condition (financial values of outputs/outcomes) is not met, CostEffectiveness Analysis (CEA) can be used to compare the cost of producing the same
set of outputs using different organisations, clearance assets, and so on. However,
using CEA in a rigorous fashion to produce a clear and unambiguous result still
requires that the first three conditions are met to a reasonable degree at least. Often –
as in this case – some data are missing or ambiguous. Good practice then entails (i)
identifying the data questions or problems, (ii) making reasonable assumptions for
how to address these and stating these assumptions clearly, and (iii) testing to assess
whether the results obtained are sensitive to reasonable changes in the assumptions
employed.
9.1.1 Data Problems and Questions
There are good data to meet the first two conditions: (i) the quantities of resource
inputs and (ii) their costs to UNMEE. There are however problems in meeting the
third condition (quantities of outputs). We need to guard against the three errors
outlined in the previous table, but more fundamentally there are serious discrepancies
in the figures reported on the areas and roads cleared. Just a few examples include:
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Table 9 – Serious Data Discrepancies
Data Source
Area cleared m2 – 2003
Slovak
Bangladeshi
Kenyan
Ronco
Road cleared km – 2003
Slovak
Bangladeshi
Kenyan
MECHEM

IMSMA data81

Annual Report 03

Audit Report

1,120,740

1,634,975

784,996
55,868
2,754,528

1,576,874
104,611
7,208,758

385,682 or 1,282,033
or 1,667,71582
1,310,563
102,620
N/A

91
651
13
791

274
263
0
649

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Discrepancies of this magnitude mean that CEA calculations for even the simplest
cases (as in the diagram below) can be called into question.
Inputs (in $)

Demining

Outputs
(quantities)

CEA
Based on advice from the Head of the MACC Information Section, we have used the
IMSMA data.
The second problem is that (at least) two different types of demining outputs are being
produced, and these are measured in different ways:
1. areas cleared (measured in square metres)
2. roads cleared (measured in linear kilometres)
This is not a problem when comparing like-with-like, but creates a problem of the
“apples versus mixed fruit” sort when comparing a unit engaged to produce a single
type of output (such as MECEM, contracted for road survey and clearance alone) with
a unit producing two types of outputs (such as the Slovak contingent, as depicted
below) unless we have reliable data on which assets worked on which type of task and
for how long. We do not have these data.

81

From file Copy of Statstics_2003-2004.xls
Table 2 on page 4 of the Audit Report gives separate figures for clearance by manual
deminers (385,682 m2) and by mechanical assets (1,282,033 m2). The mechanical assets
available to the Slovak contingents are not capable of clearing roads or areas to acceptable
standards. The T55s with rollers can do risk-reduction on roads, while the flails can do ground
preparation. Further, it is unclear whether the Slovaks did manual clearance on land that had
already been prepared by machines, or worked on entirely separate hazards.
82
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Area cleared
Inputs

Demining
Road cleared

A closely related issue in the case of Eritrea is the fact that, inherently, military
demining units offer additional benefits. If necessary, they can be pressed into other
tasks to support the mandate of the peacekeeping mission (peacekeeping, civil
construction works, etc.). They are also equipped to defend themselves and can be
deployed in situations in which the presence of civilian contractors would be
inappropriate or politically unacceptable. Their military capabilities – even if never
called upon – are available to the force commander as a reserve, allowing more active
use of other contingents. These capabilities are valuable (and a cost estimate is
provided later in this chapter). Therefore, the “production” of the Slovak,
Bangladeshi, or Kenyan demining contingents might be more correctly depicted as in
the diagram below.
Area cleared

Inputs

Demining

Road cleared

Military
capabilities
9.1.2 Calculations

Area clearance
We have adequate data for a good comparison between a military demining
contingent (the Kenyans) and a commercial demining firm for both calendar year
2003 and (with somewhat more confidence) the U.S. fiscal year 2004 (1 October 2003
to 30 September 2004). The calculations are summarised below and depicted in the
graph on the following page.
Table 10 – Cost-Effectiveness Calculations for Area Clearance

Kenyan 2003
Ronco 2003

m2
55,868
2,754,528

$
$2,626,054
$2,163,000

$/m2
$47.00
$0.79

Kenyan FY 04
Ronco FY 04

170,071
2,363,415

$2,626,054
$1,452,000

$15.44
$0.61

Ratio
59.86:1

25.13:1

Notes: Area cleared figures from IMSMA (Copy of Statstics_2003-2004.xls). Costs for
Kenyans from memo ‘Possibility of purchasing Slovak COE’ by Sergiy Mazurov, (minor recalculations by T. Paterson. Costs for Ronco from To Walk the Earth in Safety: 2004, p. 7
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We should note that Ronco uses MDDs in support of its manual teams. Depending on
weather and ground conditions, the support of MDDs can significantly enhance the
productivity of manual deminers.83 While this is not an issue from the perspective of
cost-effectiveness, it would be possible to decompose the cost-effectiveness
advantage of Ronco into two components: (i) better mix of assets and (ii) better
‘management’ of assets.84 For example, if we determined that Ronco was 25 times as
cost-effective as the Kenyans (equal to the ‘best case’ figures for 2004), and that
MDDs increased the cost-effectiveness of manual teams by two-thirds (about 67%) on
average, the decomposition would give:
Total difference = different asset mix * different management
2500% = 167% * different management
different management = 2500%/167% = 15 (i.e. 15 times as cost-effective)
Thus, the bulk of the cost-effectiveness ‘advantage’ stems from different management
approaches (broadly defined and from the perspective of cost-effectiveness).
Intangibles:
1. Both the Kenyan and Ronco clearance SOPs are IMAS compliant, so safety
for deminers, peacekeeping troops, and civilian populations is comparable.
2. Kenyan forces have military capabilities.
Graph 3 – Cost-Effectiveness: Area Clearance Comparisons

$ 50
$ 45

Cost per sq. metre

$ 40
$ 35
$ 30
Military

$ 25

Com m ercial

$ 20
$ 15
$ 10
$5
$0

Best Case

Worst Case

83

MDDs particularly enhance productivity of manual teams when there is high metal content
in the soil. This significantly slows manual clearance as the metal fragments give many ‘false
positive’ readings with metal detectors.
84
Of course, we do not mean to imply the Kenyan officers or others in the Force chain of
command are bad managers. We have not studied this question in detail and are in no
position to make a pronouncement. It does seem reasonable to conclude that military forces
and their officers face very different incentives than do commercial firms and managers and –
put simply – the top priority of military officers is not to maximise the cost-effectiveness of
their demining operations.
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Road clearance
We have comparable IMSMA data for production for MECHEM and the Slovak
demining units. We also have solid cost data for both organisations. However, the
Slovak units also conduct area clearance operations (both clearance and ground
preparation by machine) and civil engineering works. We do not have detailed data on
which Slovak assets were assigned to which tasks, so cannot allocate the total costs
for the Slovak contingent with confidence. Therefore, we have compiled “best case”
and “worst case” figures (from the Slovak perspective):
Best case – We assume that only the assets specifically designed for road clearance
(albeit, not in compliance with IMAS) and the minimum necessary troops and
supporting assets are charged to road clearance, along with a contribution to
overheads based on the numbers of troops. Specifically, the “Road Clearance
Package” of assets and associated costs are:
Table 11 – Minimum costs of Slovak Road Clearance Capacities
Item
Unit cost/mo.
Units
Cost/month
Tanks, mine clearing
$8,477.00
4
$35,630.00
Roller system for tanks
$1,422.00
4
$6,003.00
Ambulances
$4,727.00
4
$19,828.00
Troops & leader for above
$1,181.93
19
$22,456.73
Supporting
$1,181.93
5
$5,909.67
Petrol, oil, lubricants
$18,000.00
Total, direct costs of Road clearance package
$107,827.40
All other costs for Slovak contingent
$715,634.91
Allocation of other costs (36 troops/200 troops * cost)
$85,876.19
Total costs/month, Road clearance package
$193,703.59
Annual total costs, Road clearance package
$2,324,443.07
Notes: Cost figures from data in memo ‘Possibility of purchasing Slovak COE’ by
Sergiy Mazurov, with supplemental calculations by T. Paterson.

Worst case: All road clearance by the Slovaks and by MECHEM are converted to
estimates of areas cleared (m2)85 and combined with those given for area clearance.
The total costs of both Slovaks and MECHEM are then used to calculate costs per m2.
To compare full year periods, clearance data for January-December 2003 is used for
the Slovaks (who departed mid-2004), while October 2003 – September 2004 are
used for MECHEM (which started operations in September 2003). The intermediate
calculations are:
Slovaks (2003)
MECHEM (2003-04)

km
91
2,156

m2 (Roads)
637,000
15,092,000

m2 Other
1,120,740
0

Total m2
1,757,740
15,092,000

The cost-effectiveness calculations are then:
85

Road width averaged 7 meters (e-mail from D. Bax to J. Dirscherl, dated 9 December
2004). Therefore, 1 km or road is estimated as 7 meters * 1000 meters = 7,000 m2.
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Table 12 – Cost-Effectiveness Calculations for Road Clearance
km or m2

$
$/unit
Ratio
Best case:
91 km
$2,324,443
$25,543
Slovaks (2003)
35.12:1
2,156 km
$1,568,371
$727
MECHEM (2003-04)
Worst case:
1,757,740
$10,522,201
$5.99
Slovaks (2003)
57.62:1
15,092,000
$1,568,371
$0.10
MECHEM (2003-04)
Notes: Area cleared figures from IMSMA (file Copy of Statstics_2003-2004.xls)
Cost figures for Slovaks from data in memo ‘Possibility of purchasing Slovak COE’ by Sergiy
Mazurov, with minor re-calculations by T. Paterson, and from the MOU for the Slovaks.
Cost figures for Mechem from the OIOS Audit Report (September 2004), p. 3

Intangibles:
1. The Slovak road clearance machines (tanks and rollers) are not IMAS
compliant, but the combined assets deployed by MECHEM are. Safety for
deminers, peacekeeping troops, and civilian populations is likely to be higher
for roads surveyed and cleared by MECHEM. Roads “cleared” by the Slovak
contingents may have to be re-cleared for full civilian use.
2. Slovak forces have military capabilities.
Graph 4 – Cost-Effectiveness Examples: Road Clearance
Road Clearance 'Worst Case'

Road Clearance 'Best Case'
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Valuing Military Capabilities
To this point, we have referred to military capabilities as an intangible benefit
associated with military demining units. However, the TCCs are paid for their
personnel and equipment and, assuming this payment is a reasonable reflection of the
value of the military capabilities, this would allow us to make a concrete estimate of
the value of this ‘intangible’. Reviewing the MOUs in detail and deducting the
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equipment useful only for demining allows us to generate the following estimates (in
millions of dollars per year):
Table 13 – Valuing Military Capabilities
Total cost of Force demining units
Less: specialised demining equipment
Cost of military capabilities
Savings (for paying civilian deminers)

$18.6 m
-$2.3 m
$16.3 m
$2.3 m

Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that the primary benefit from replacing military
demining units with commercial demining firms will be a reduction in the total costs
of UNMEE operations. If the troops in the demining units were, for example, infantry
without specialised equipment, the reimbursement from the UN to the TCCs would
still be in the neighbourhood of $16.3 million per annum. Thus, the principal benefits
of using commercial demining firms are: (i) higher productivity, (ii) clearance to
higher standards, and (iii) enhanced flexibility in deployment of assets.
9.1.3 Conclusions
In Eritrea, military demining assets have been between 25 and 60 times more
expensive than civilian86 demining assets from the perspective of the areas surveyed
and cleared. In addition, civilian assets have been working to higher standards of
quality and safety than have most of the military demining units available to UNMEE
to this point in time.
Military demining units embody both demining capacities and military capacities.
This same set of capacities could be provided at less expense by (i) civilian demining
assets coupled with (ii) conventionally equipped combat and support units from
TCCs. In addition, UNMEE would benefit because far more roads and dangerous
areas would be cleared, and to higher standards. Civilians who will also use those
roads and areas will similarly benefit.

9.2

Effectiveness of UNOPS as Executing Agency

One of the subordinate objectives listed in the TORs was to:
Review the performance of UNOPS as Executing Agency and its effectiveness in
providing substantive and management services as well as administrative and
financial support.
The evaluation team did not have the time to conduct the kind of detailed analysis of
the performance of UNOPS that would be necessary for an authoritative response to
whether the agency provides services in a cost-effective manner – a question which
would require a comparison with other organisations discharging similar
86

The data available do not allow a direct comparison of different categories of civilian
demining organisations – commercial firms versus not-for-profit NGOs. Therefore, we use the
generic term ‘civilian’.
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responsibilities or, at the very least, a comparison with performance benchmarks
which do not, to our knowledge, exist.
Our investigations do, however, support the following conclusions:
•

•

•
•

•

•

•

9.3

The UNOPS mandate, policies, and procedures allow it to respond more
flexibly – including by contracting specialised assets & expertise from civilian
organisations – than DPKO, which must deal with sometimes quixotic
Security Council resolutions and mobilise resources through complex
negotiations with TCCs;
UNOPS has extensive experience in supporting mine action programmes for
both UNMAS and UNDP, and has developed a large roster, a variety of
specialised policies and procedures, administrative aids, etc.;
UNOPS has played a key role in overall management of the programme,
including technical, contractual, financial and administrative support;
In reviewing the role of UNOPS with respect to identification, selection and
recruitment of personnel, the evaluation team considered that good judgement
had prevailed;
Drawing upon its specialised experience, UNOPS has been able to identify
and contract appropriate assets for the principal demining challenge facing the
Force (road survey and clearance);
When performance requirements changed for a commercial demining firm,
UNOPS took appropriate action and engaged a second firm using appropriate
and efficient tendering procedures. The performance of the second firm has
been most satisfactory;
While the evaluation did not entail a management audit which would allow us
to pronounce more fully on the efficiency & effectiveness of UNOPS relative
to other organisations providing project management support services in
complex environments, the evaluation team found no evidence of errors,
omissions, or unwarranted delays on the part of UNOPS which have
jeopardised the effectiveness of the MACC.

Recommendations

In light of the conclusions drawn concerning civilian versus military assets and the
capacities and performance on UNOPS, the following recommendation is proffered:
DPKO should actively consider using non-military resources – engaged through
UNOPS when appropriate – in support of its security council mandates,
particularly when:
• A specific role or task is well defined (including quality standards) and
can be used as the basis for a contract with clear performance
specifications;
• Civilian organisations have more appropriate equipment, procedures,
and/or experience for that role or task;
• The overall security situation allows the deployment of civilians.
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Chapter 10 – Conclusions, Recommendations and
Lessons Learned
We may identify two defining moments in the unfolding of UNMEE MACC’s
programme: (i) the initial Security Council Resolution of the year 2000 allowing the
MACC to become active in coordinating humanitarian mine action, a mandate so
imprecise that the scope of work was only limited by one’s own creativity; and (ii) the
President’s Proclamation 123 of mid-2002 with the effect of drastically confining the
role of UNMEE MACC to activities in support of the Force only.
The ambiguous mandate of the MACC stemming from the first Security Council
Resolution led to a liberal interpretation of activities, and the first two years were
characterized by a fast pace of work, under competent management, that included
institutional development tasks. Unfortunately, the MACC did not succeed in
coordinating demining in the TSZ, a task that can only be properly exercised given a
number of pre-conditions that were not there, including a clearly defined appreciation
of the mandate, and a good understanding of contamination. The fact that the mandate
was not backed up by explicit concurrence at the highest level, as well as an outline of
strategy accompanied by a definition of detailed roles and responsibilities right at the
start, made the mandate unsustainable. The fluid and unpredictable political sentiment
in the country was a serious complicating factor.
The President’s Proclamation 123, effectively curtailing the mandate, forced the
MACC to re-invent itself with respect to both its role and its management structure.
From the point of view of management, the Proclamation was perhaps a blessing in
disguise. It resulted in an integrated structure combining FMAC and UNMACC
management under one roof without diminishing the Force Commander’s authority.
The innovative idea won the UN 21 award, and can be applied to similar situations
elsewhere with good benefit. With respect to operations, however, the MACC’s role
was seriously diminished. Its capacity-building work became confined to supporting
the new Eritrean Demining Authority in the field of information technology and
medical support.
As is evident from the Force’s QIP programme, there is a close congruence between
the needs of the communities and the needs of the Force (as part of Mission
requirements), if only to build good relations with one another. This is especially
relevant after a state of emergency has transformed itself into a state of stability. The
currently confined mandate of the UNMEE MACC has significant scope for
enhancement by prioritising demining tasks in such a way that important secondary
benefits accrue to the population.
The MACC currently presents noteworthy strengths: a close management connection
to the troops sharing a common command structure that could serve as an example
elsewhere, MRE integrated into clearance priorities, a map production capability that
is state of the art, a very useful database system (the latter still in need of
improvement, however), stability of staff, and good programme management willing
to look ahead particularly in terms of the need for alternative demining assets.
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Yet, there remain significant challenges. Sensitivity to a volatile political climate is
constantly required. The currently limited mandate can generally be enhanced only by
acknowledging political realities, and acquiring the concurrence of national
authorities. The MACC is staffed with competent individuals, but with a restricted
mandate there seems to be over-capacity. Staff economies of scale are exceedingly
low compared to the situation in, say, Afghanistan where a relatively modest number
of international staff manages a very large number of deminers.
Of greatest concern is the low productivity of demining contingents, the
inappropriateness of mechanical devices employed, and the lack of sufficient mine
action standards exhibited by at least one contingent, the Bangladeshis. Evidence
strongly suggests the need for prior agreement on the type and quality of demining
assets before the deployment of demining contingents, and the insistence on prior
training in order that international mine action standards be introduced and
maintained.
The deployment of commercial demining assets has proven to be very cost-effective
considering their relatively modest costs and high productivity. The introduction of
some complementary commercial demining assets should be contemplated at the very
start of a peacekeeping mission, and certainly when a phase of stability has been
reached.
A summary of recommendations and lessons learned is offered below.

Recommendations – UNMEE MACC Specific
It is recommended that UNMEE MACC prepare a costed proposal for the
further enhancement of its mine action activities that would accomplish the
three-fold objective of force protection, force mobility and community support
designed to gain the goodwill of the population.87
It is recommended to re-examine UNMEE MACC staffing options, including
further staffing amalgamation options, and define a mine action programme that
would enhance current activities by ensuring: (i) the satisfaction of military
requirements; and (ii) the satisfaction of community aspirations in line with
Force or Mission objectives.
In spite of important recent upgrades that now allow the IMSMA system to
operate relatively smoothly, work still needs to be done to resolve remaining
technical problems, with particular emphasis on removing remaining ‘add-ons’,
and facilitating ease of access by significantly simplifying the system.

87

Subsequent to the evaluation mission, UNMAS and UNOPS contracted commercial
organisations to provide mechanical and EDD assets in support of the Kenyan demining
contingent, creating a combined commercial-military capacity. This is termed the Integrated
Demining Contract (IDC), and is in line with our recommendation. More generally, we
encourage UNMAS to update its analysis of the capacities required to meet the Force
Commander’s objectives on a periodic basis, and give active consideration to alternative
means for providing the requisite capacities in the most cost-effective manner.
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Additional efforts will have to be made for handover of IMSMA expertise to the
national authorities (EDA), an effort that requires full EDA participation
(especially the recruitment and training of an IT specialist) and continued close
cooperation between UNMEE MACC and UNDP.

Recommendations – General
Any involvement of a peacekeeping mission, or an entity closely associated with a
peacekeeping mission, to support building of indigenous mine action capacity,
should generally be contemplated with a full understanding and consideration of
the consequences. Such involvement should be subject to a clear and
unambiguous agreement between the UN and the Government at the highest
level identifying mutual commitments and responsibilities.
It is recommended that, in defining the mandate of a civilian mine action
coordination centre attached to a peacekeeping mission, considerable effort be
made to outline, for Security Council deliberations, the precise scope of the
MACC's responsibilities within the evolving context of political, humanitarian
and peacekeeping realities, and in line with the MACC’s comparative advantage.
It is recommended that the mandate of a civilian Mine Action Coordination
Centre within a peacekeeping mission be enhanced by tying it very closely to the
objectives of the Peacekeeping Mission itself, necessitating a careful analysis of
ways in which the MACC can satisfy basic aspirations of the people in the region
in line with the Force’s goals.
UNMAS should be actively involved in the planning for peacekeeping missions,
including the definition of mission requirements, and work with the Forcegenerating unit in areas of equipment planning and establishment of standards.
Mission requirements should be reviewed on an agreed basis and schedule to
assess whether comparative advantages between military/commercial/civilian
mine action entities have shifted.
A MOU with a TCC covering the operation of a demining contingent should
include the authority of a MACC to ensure IMAS compatibility.
A Joint Assessment Mission should include a highly experienced mine action
specialist thoroughly familiar with force demining requirements as well as
demining in accordance with IMAS. The specialist should also have a sound
knowledge of all demining technologies available and their appropriate
application. DPKO may have to fall back on external expertise to cover the
whole range of aspects.
The need for a judicious mix of demining assets will need to be anticipated right
at the start of the mission, based on:
i. a clear definition of tasks expected to be performed, combined with a
liberal rather than a narrow interpretation of the Security Council
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Resolution defining the mandate (see also above recommendation calling
for a substantially enhanced definition of mandate);
ii. the realization that there is a considerable dual benefit of demining
accruing to both the Mission and the affected communities; and
iii. the significant scope that exists to supplement and/or complement
traditional contingent demining assets with commercial demining assets.
DPKO needs to institutionalise the authority and competence to negotiate with
TCC in order to ensure the best contribution suited to circumstances. UNMAS
could play an important role in this respect.
The Assessed Budget should include a well-considered mix of expenditures that
takes into account the natural unfolding of demining activities that normally
change significantly when the mission moves from an emergency state to a state
of stability.
Military demining assets offered by TCCs have to be assessed accurately prior
their deployment with the prospect of their potential utilization, clearance
performance, suitability for the particular environment and cost-effectiveness.
DPKO should arrange for a review of the use of the assets deployed to a mission
after one year aiming to do adjustments, if necessary.
The potential advantage of commercial assets should be taken into consideration
from the beginning of a mission if the security situation allows.
Demining staff intended to be used in the UN area of responsibility must be
trained, prior to deployment, to apply international mine action standards.
UNMAS may wish to consider quality assuring existing regional mine action
training centres for future training purposes of TCC contingents.
Donors may have to be requested to contribute equipment and training to
compensate for second rate demining assets belonging to demining contingents.
DPKO should actively consider using non-military resources – engaged through
UNOPS when appropriate – in support of its security council mandates,
particularly when:
• A specific role or task is well defined (including quality standards) and
can be used as the basis for a contract with clear performance
specifications;
• Civilian organisations have more appropriate equipment, procedures,
and/or experience for that role or task;
• The overall security situation allows the deployment of civilians.
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Lessons Learned
The integration of civil and military mine action assets under a joint mine action
structure, fully respecting Force authority, is an efficient and effective way to
plan and execute a mine action response.
The revised MACC work plan was a creative and appropriate response to the
unexpected and drastic decisions of the Eritrean Government in mid-2002. It
resulted, in fact, in increased efficiency of UNMEE MACC operations by
integrating military demining assets into a civilian-run mine action centre.
Capacity development support by a specialized agency with a relevant core
mandate, should start immediately after cessation of hostility and the arrival of a
peacekeeping force, not two years later.
Mine action must have national ownership to be successful and sustainable. This
also infers that demining should be included in national development plans as a
pre-condition to achieve development goals.
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Annex 1 – Terms of Reference
Evaluation Mission of the UNMEE Mine Action
Co-ordination Centre
Background
Based on Security Council Resolution 1320 of 15 September 2000, the United
Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), through the United Nations Mine
Action Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Office for Project Services
(UNOPS), established a Mine Action Programme responsible for the UN established
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) along the disputed border between Ethiopia and
Eritrea and in areas adjacent to the TSZ. The aim was to provide coordination and
technical assistance for humanitarian mine action within the TSZ and areas adjacent.
To that end, the UNMEE Mine Action Co-ordination Centre (MACC) was established
in Asmara.
The programme was initiated in late 2000. Soon after beginning its coordination
function with three international and one national non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), a bi-laterally funded international contractor and the UNMEE force
demining assets as implementers, the MACC began working with the Eritrean
government to build a national mine action programme. In response to an increasing
number of anti-tank mines planted on roads in the TSZ, the MACC added a
mechanical route clearance contractor under its direct tasking. The national NGO for
mine action and the Eritrean Mine Action Programme (EMAP), though never
formally incorporated by the government, was supported by the MACC and later
additional assistance was provided by the UNDP mine action capacity building
programme starting in early 2002. The support to EMAP came to an end in July 2002
with the issuance of Presidential decree 123/2002 that established the Eritrean
Demining Authority (EDA). The decree meant the dissolution of EMAP and all
cooperative agreements it had signed. In August of the same year, the government
issued a letter to all mine action NGOs to cease operations in Eritrea. All but HALO
Trust terminated activities in 2002, though HALO was eventually asked to leave and
did so in June 2003.
With the end of EMAP and direct assistance to the Eritrean Government, the MACC
concentrated on mandated activities in support of the peacekeeping mission. The
UNMEE mandate for mine action was expanded through Resolution 1430 adopted on
14 August 2002 to provide demining in key areas to support the demarcation work of
the Ethiopian Eritrean Boundary Commission (EEBC). The revised work plan
implemented at the end if 2002 brought the force demining assets and command
structure under the coordination of the MACC, an achievement that earned the
MACC a UN 21 Award for increased team productivity in 2003. The work of the
MACC related to the EEBC demarcation is currently suspended due to a political
dispute between the two parties over portions of the proposed border. The MACC is
currently overseeing a major shift in UNMEE demining assets with the repatriation of
a mechanical contingent from Slovakia with a proposal to hire a commercial firm to
fill that role.
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The MACC recently under-went an internal audit performed by the resident OIOS
auditors in UNMEE.
Goals of the Evaluation
The goals of the evaluation are:
•
•
•

Define the coordination role of the programme in Ethiopia and Eritrea through
mid-2002
Define the optimal integration of peacekeeping force demining assets under a
civilian-run coordination centre
Provide a cost benefit analysis of peacekeeping demining versus commercial
demining in support of a security council mandate

Objectives of the Evaluation
The objectives of the evaluation are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

to evaluate the original build-up of the MACC, the organizational structure
and its overall effectiveness as a coordination/oversight body;
to evaluate the implementation arrangements under which the MACC has
operated and to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of this approach;
to evaluate the coordination role of the MACC from start-up through mnid2002 and assess its impact on mine action activities in Eritrea
to evaluate the revised work plan designed in late 2002 and its
implementation, including the effectiveness of peacekeeping force demining
assets under the MACC;
to assess the use of peacekeeping demining assets versus commercial assets
including indicators of access, productivity, flexibility, cost and related
factors;
to analyze the relationship with the UNDP Eritrea Mine Action Capacity
Building Programme with a focus on how the relationship has impacted UN
coordination and humanitarian mine action in Eritrea;
to determine how the donors that support mine action in Ethiopia and Eritrea
evaluate the MACC and what, in their view, is the added value it offers;
to determine lessons learned and to make recommendations for the UN and
international donors.
to comment on the future resource requirements of the MACC.

Issues to be addressed:
In order to achieve the objective of the evaluation the team members will address the
following issues:
Phases of peacekeeping mandated mine action in Ethiopia and Eritrea:
•

Review the sequence of events that led to the initiation of the programme and
its development since;
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•
•
•

Assess the timeliness and effectiveness of the UN and international mine
action response throughout the operation;
Assess the cooperation and coordination between the MACC, UNMEE HQ,
other UN agencies, government bodies and NGO operators as the programme
evolved;
Draw lessons for future emergency operations;

Inputs versus outputs during the life of the programme:
•
•
•

Review the financial and human resource inputs and how they have changed with
the real and perceived responsibilities of the MACC;
Evaluate the total real cost of UN supported assets and interventions and the
results achieved for each;
Consider what alternate arrangements would have been feasible given the
operating environment and how they would compare to the inputs used during the
programme.

Current status of mine action in the TSZ and areas adjacent:
•
•

Review the operational requirements of the programme and the resources
available and recommend any changes required to meet operational needs;
Review the implementation modalities of the programme and recommend what
action should be taken for future programmes implemented under similar
circumstances;

Efficiency of project management arrangements:
•

•
•
•
•
•

Analyse the Programme's management role, resource mobilization role,
coordination role, reporting, communications and planning, review the roles and
responsibilities of the project manager and international contracted and in-kind
experts;
Review MACC relation to bilaterally funded operators, bilateral contracts and
terms supporting or complicating the MACC's coordination role;
Review the relationship with UNMEE to determine the effectiveness of
Programme within the context of the larger UN Mission;
Evaluate the effectiveness of the IMSMA system and determine how it has
contributed to the overall management of the mine action programme in Eritrea;
Review the performance of UNOPS as Executing Agency and its effectiveness in
providing substantive and management services as well as administrative and
financial support;
Review the performance of UNMAS in supporting the project in terms of resource
mobilization and advocacy, management, and project implementation.

Resource mobilization and donor support:
•
•

Assess the UNMAS and MACC roles as perceived by donors;
Assess the impact of the assessed budget funding on the implementation of the
programme.
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Programme results and achievements:
•
•
•
•

Determine to what extent the objectives and outputs outlined by the Programme
have been met;
Comment on the effect of funding in terms of levels and timeliness during the
duration of the programme;
Recommend what actions should be taken to ensure that the project objectives are
met as planned for future mine action programmes;
Review project results with emphasis on Security Council mandates and longerterm impact.

The main stakeholders are:
- UNMAS
- UNMEE
- UNOPS
- Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC)
- Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA);
- Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO);
- Mine Action organisations operators in Eritrea and Ethiopia (i.e. International NGO
and commercial companies);
- International community as donors
- UNDP
- UNICEF
- Eritrean Commission for Coordination with the Peacekeeping Mission (CCPM);
- Eritrean Resettlement and Rehabilitation Commission (ERRC);
- Population in mine affected areas;
Scope of the Evaluation
The team should consider the primary objectives and outputs for the phases as stated
by the original Strategy document, work Plan 2002 and work Plan 2004 in the context
of all aspects of an integrated mine action programme: mine awareness, mine
information, training, surveys and minefield marking; mine clearance; victim
assistance and rehabilitation, quality management, accreditation and tasking
procedures.
Methodology of the Evaluation Team
The evaluation team will (in New York):
•
•

Be briefed by the UNMAS and UNOPS immediately upon arrival to New
York. A series of meetings will be organized with UNDP, UNICEF, UNOPS
etc.
Compile documentation for review such as the Strategy, concept of operations,
progress reports, monthly reports, etc

The evaluation team will (in Eritrea):
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•

•
•
•

Conduct interviews with major stakeholders, including the UN Mission in
Ethiopia and Eritrea, UNDP, UNICEF, Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary
Commission (EEBC), Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA), CCPM,
representatives of major donor contributing countries, clearance NGO (EDO),
commercial companies, etc
Conduct targeted field visits to verify Programme plans and implementation of
priorities in accordance with international standards and to identify further
needs for assistance if any
Have discussions with staff involved in program implementation
The MACC will facilitate and coordinate a schedule of meetings for the
evaluation team, provide logistics and support for gathering the information.

The evaluation team will (in Donor Capitals):
•
•
•
•

Conduct interviews with donor agencies to determine the rationale and
expectations
review funding decisions to the MACC
assess the outlook for future funding for the MACC and mine-action in
general in Eritrea and Ethiopia
Have discussions with representatives of NGO implementers where possible
to collect relevant information on MACC-NGO coordination (most former
operators no longer operate or have representatives in Eritrea).

Evaluation Team
The Evaluation team will be composed of two independent consultants (experts) of
whom one will focus on questions of organizational design and management, and the
other will focus on technical aspects of the mine action activities. The team should
offer a broad range of experience and skills offering both UN and NGO perspectives.
UNMAS will assume the role of managing the evaluation exercise, working closely
with the members of the evaluation team to ensure effective monitoring of the
exercise and concurrence with the objectives as defined by the TOR.
Time Frame and Conclusions of the Mission
The Evaluation Mission is planned to take place from September to November 2004.
The total duration of the mission is eight weeks. One week prior to deployment in
New York, four to five weeks in Eritrea and Ethiopia, up to two weeks visiting key
donor capitals and two weeks drafting the report.
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Annex 2 – MACBP Key Milestones88
Feb-02

CTA MACBP arrives
Formation of UNDP advisory team initiated (CTA, TA, VA, LIS)

Mar-02

STA LIS arrives

Apr-02

Original MACBP Project Document signed, includes only
- LIS
- EDA500 K equipment for old EDA
- Some assistance to EMAP headquarters
- Remainder of programme vested with UNMEE MACC and NGOs
Project Cooperation Agreement UNDP and UNOPS
Project Cooperation Agreement UNDP and EMAP
TA LIS and TA AFL (LIS) arrive
Equipment for LIS, EMAP, VA ordered.

May-02

LIS national staff selected
Capacity building in EMAP initiated in MACC Departments

Jul-02

Proclamation 123 published to establish the Eritrean Demining
Authority
EMAP and old EDA cease operations
MAT, DDG, DCA expelled

Sep-02

ESCA engaged as partner for Implementation of LIS

Oct-02

GM EDA appointed
TA Victim Assistance arrives

Dec-02

Initial MACBP project document fully funded (approx US $3m)
Staff assembled for EDA/EDO
Assisted UNMAS with production of UN policy for VA

Jan-03

MACBP leases office accommodation for EDA/EDO
VA training initiated to identify priorities

Feb-03

GM certifies EDA/EDO conduct in compliance with IMAS
Interim Strategic Framework Drafted

Mar-03

EDA/EDO office equipment installed
Computer training and English classes initiated
Proposal for analysis of national survey for people with disability
developed

88

Verbatim from MACBP document
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Apr-03

Prodoc revision initiated (to include new activities affordable within
existing budget (e.g. TAs)
Equipment ordered for EDA read only database
Equipment ordered for disability survey analysis
Briefings initiated with EU and Norwegians
MOU initiated between HAL and EDO
Minister of Labour and Human Welfare endorses Direction Paper in
Victim Support

May-03

Field equipment starts to be transferred from MACC to EDO
Agreement with MACC/SRSA to share IMSMA officer
Approval for TAs Ops and Field Ops; recruiting initiated

Jun-03

First intervention in Strategic Planning by Cranfield University
LIS TA departs; LIS management restructured, new TA arrives
HALO departure directed

Jul-03

Revised programme document for three years submitted for approval
TA field Ops arrives
LIS operations review, 2nd QA complete
EDA deputy director attends Cranfield Senior Management course
LIS evaluation by EU

Aug-02

TA Ops arrives
LIS restructured, increased production by 30%
Six MRE teams complete refresher training
UNICEF Project Cooperation Agreement in MRE

Dec-03

3 x MCT accredited and commence operations
MAP 04 launched at Open House
EDA QA team commences operations

Jan-04

Refresher training conducted for operational teams
RONCO MDDT integrate ops with EDO teams

Mar-04

Equipment ordered for 2x20 deminer MCTs and 2xEOD

Jun-04

LIS completed

Jul-04

Training commenced for new MCTs
Prodoc approved
Emergency Access order sent to UNOPS
Implementation national survey (disability) analysis underway

Aug-04

PWC mission completed
Appraisal completed
Draft National Strategic Plan completed
Draft Article 5 completed

Sep-04

Article 7 update submitted
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New team training completed, preparing for accreditation
PCA for emergency access approved
Workshop studies Integrated Community Approach
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Annex 3 – Bilateral Donor Contributions to Eritrea
(US$ m)
Donors
Canada
Denmark
Eur.Union
Finland
Germany
Japan
Netherlands
Norway
Switzerland
U. S.

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

4.200
0.837
2.025

0.500

2001

2002

2003

1.072
2.199
1.551
0.099
0.728

0.068

0.150

0.100
0.563
3.500

1.548

0.500
0.333
0.075
1.205

0.488

Total
1.290
2.199
1.551
0.99
0.827
0.563
9.748
1.170
0.563
3.730

Total 0.837
0
0
0 2.025
0 4.700 7.762 4.720 1.698 21.742
Source: MBZ, Netherlands (Norway has additional contributions not reflected here for 2002
and 2003.)
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Annex 4 – People Interviewed
UNMEE
Legwaila J. Legwaila
General Rajender Singh

Senior Representative of the Secretary General, Eritrea
Force Commander

UN Head Office – New York

Angela Kane
Hiroshi Murakami

Assistant Secretary General
Secretary, EEBC

DPKO / UNMAS - New York
Martin Barber
John Flanagan
General Cammaert
Hiroshi Murakami
Justin Brady
Akiko Ikeda
Arezou Azad
Sebastian Kasack
Andreas Sugar
Nicolas von Ruben
Lt. Col Fernando Martins
Major Xuqiang Qiu
Ilene Cohn
Noel Mulliner
Fred Malya

Director, UNMAS
Chief, Programme Support Section, UNMAS
Military Advisor to the Secretary General
Chief, Cartographic Section, Situation Centre, DPKO
Programme Officer, UNMAS
Victim Assistance Officer, UNMAS
Policy Coordination Officer, UNMAS
Mine Risk Education Officer, UNMAS
Political Affairs Officer, Africa Division, OO
Chief, Engineering Section, OMS
Force Generation Service, MD
Military Planning, MD
Chief, Policy, UNMAS
Technology Coordinator, UNMAS,
Best Practices, PBPU

UNOPS - New York
Lisa Gomer
Michael Mersereau
Johan van der Merwe

Manager, Global and Inter-Regional Division
Senior Portfolio Manager, Mine Action Unit
Technical Advisor, Mine Action Unit

UNDP – New York
Oren J. Schlein
Archie Law

Advisor, Mine Action Unit
Advisor, Mine Action Unit

UNICEF-New York
Julie E. Meyers

Project Officer, Office of Emergency Programmes

UNMEE MACC
Phil Lewis
Venkata Raman

Programme Manager
Chief, Administration and Finance
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Gerhard Bechtold
Lars Lundberg
Bob Kudyba
Christopher Whatakope
Petrus Brink
LtCol Kalume Mbitha
LtCol Suleiman Nyamwaya

Chief of Information
Medical Coordinator
Operations Officer
Regional Manager, QA Officer
Regional Manager, QA Officer
Mine Action Liaison Officer
MRE Officer, Kenya Army

UNDP-EDA/EDO, Eritrea
Simon R. Nhongo
B.Nyarko-Mensah Snr.
Joseph Wenkoff
Rita Mazzocchi
Jane Brouillette
Per-Olof Saelen
David Harrison
Hansie Heymans

Resident Representative
Deputy Resident Representative
CTA/Programme Manager, MACBP
Programme Analyst
Advisor, Victim Assistance
Technical Advisor, MABCP
IMSMA, UNMEE MAC / MACBP
Planning Officer, MABCP

Ronco-Eritrea
Will Haynes

Programme Manager, Ronco

UNICEF-Eritrea
Lejla Susic

Mine Risk Education Coordinator

UNHCR-Eritrea
Pirjo Dupuy

Representative

Bilateral Donors(in Eritrea)
Geert Heikens
J. Sonderbert
HE Scott H. Delisi
Arild Skara
Pim Kraam
Joseph Hoenen

Head of Delegation, EU
Mine Action Advisor, EU
Ambassador, USA
First Secretary, Royal Norwegian Embassy
Deputy Head, Humanitarian Aid, (Dutch) MBZ
Head Dev. Cooperation, Royal Dutch Embassy

Representatives in European Capitals
Johanneke de Hoogh
Elizabeth Narrowe
Pehr Lodhammer
LtCol Jelinek

Sr. Policy Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs, (Dutch) MBZ
Programme Officer, Swedish Int. Dev. Agency
Head, Mine Action Section, SRSA
Ministry of Defence, Slovakia
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Annex 5 – Letter from UNMAS Management
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Maps
Map of Senafe

The boundaries and names on the maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Map of Shilalo

The boundaries and names on the maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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Map of Tsorona

The boundaries and names on the maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
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